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This edition of the Management Quarterly is a continua-
tion of a student project initiated in the Fourth Quarter of 
the 1968-1969 academic year. 
The articles presented in this issue of the Management 
Quarterly represent an expanded effort in that papers were 
selected not only from the Department of Operations Research 
and Administrative Sciences but the Department of Government 
as well. This wider search for excellence and uniqueness of 
student ideas and proposals allowed the editors to be more 
selective in its approach to types of papers that could be 
presented. 
This widened effort resulted in two articles of note: 
the first, "Stable Place to Have a Base," concerns the current 
issue of United States policy in continuing the effort of 
developing a logistics base in the Indian Ocean and presents 
a spectrum of opinions surrounding the current decision. The 
seccnd paper concerns United States national security policy 
and the cruise missile program. For these two articles the 
editors express their appreciation to the professors of the 
Department of Government for their efforts to support the 
search for unique articles of interest. 
. Additionally, articles in the past have been researched 
and one article concerning "Sensitivity Training and Its 
Application in the Navy 11 came forth that is just as current 
today as when it was prepared in 1973. The editors antici-
pate that the readers will find this article of interest as 
the Navy's human resources program goes on. Also we have 
decided to republish an article, which is a departure from 
previous procedures. It was considered that Lieutenant 
Conunander J.M. McGrath's article 11American POWs: North 
Korea and North Vietnam" warranted special attention again as 
it reviewed a portion of his six year experience in North 
Vietnam as a POW. The editors express their appreciation to 
Lieutenant Commander McGrath for allowing this special re-
print. 
As one of the two current selections from the Department 
of Operations Research and Administrative Sciences, the 
editors have chosen "Military Unionization in the United 
il 
States? A Background Paper." This paper provides past in-
formation for dealing with the increasingly important person- O ~ 
nel issues that will be facing the military services as the 
"a l l volunteer force" continues in the Nation. 
Last , but certainly not least, the editors were particu-
larly impressed with the paper discussing the "Military 
Industrial Comp l ex and Its Impact on the United States 
Economy." The readership will find this paper especially O 
rewarding and is highly recommended. 
We believe that all of the above will stimulate interest 
and further thoughts for meaningful research . Our thanks go 
out to the professors of the Department of Operations Research 
and Administrative Sciences for their unqualified support in 
search of exce l lence. Additionally, the editors would like 
to thank Lieutenant Commander J. Monza, Supply Corps, U.S. 
Navy, Assistant Administrative Sciences Curricula Officer, 
for his support and liaison in planning for the editorial 
staff. 
The views expressed in the papers selected for publica-
tion in this edition of the Management Quarterly are those of 
the authors exclusively and in no way reflect the attitude or 
endorsement by the Department of Defense, Navy Department or 




STABLE PLACE TO HAVE A BASE 
By John Ca.6teJt.i.ine. 
The aathoJr. 06 tw po.pell. e.x.am.lnu :the. poU.c.y dec.l6.lon 
06 :the. Un.lte.d Sta.tu to c.ontinu.e. wU:h :the buil.d up 06 
a. log.i..6.ti.C6 ba.6 e. .i.n. :the. 1 ncUa.n Oc.e.a.n. It .i..6 lug h-
Ug hte.d by ValUOUli op,i.ni.onti p,r,ue.nte.d by :the. aathoJt 
c.onc.elmi.ng :the. .i.mpUca.tion 06 ho.v-i.ng a. .f.og.i..6ilcJi ba.6e. 
.i.n. tltl6 all.ea. 06 :the. wolLf.d. The Jr.ea.de.Jr. mo.y ag.1tee oJr. 
cll6ag1r.ee wlt.h the c.onc.lUliion oo :the. a..ui:hoJr., howe.veJr.., 
li .i..6 c.eJtt.tLi.n that :the a.u:thoJr. 'A .lde.a.6 w.iU .&.umula.:te. 
Jr.ea.de.Jr. th. i.nfung on :the 1>u.b j ec.t. 
Tlli pa.pelr.. wall p,r,uente.d to PJr.06u1>0.1t. Donald C. 
Va.n.le.f. a.6 paAt 06 c.oU/L6e .1teqt.Wl.emew 6oJr. AmeJLlc.a.n 
Na.ti.onal. Sec.Ulut.Ij PoUc.y (GS 3061). 
The British decision to withdraw from east of the Suez 
Canal by 1971, coupled with a growing Soviet military and 
commercial fleet, has caused great controversy over the 
United States role in the Indian Ocean. The premise of 
President Nixon's doctrine of a lowered profile was that we 
would rely more heavily on other countries to provide a pro-
portionate share of the military forces throughout the world. 
This policy is now being used a,s justification by those 
opposed to U.S. military expansion on Diego Garcia, a British 
owned island in the Indian Ocean. The proposed construction 
would entail widening and deepening the harbor to accommodate 
a carrier task force; lengthening the runway to 12,000 feet 
(still, B-S2's would not be able to use the runway on a sus-
tained basis); increase the POL storage area; improve the 
existing communication facility; construct barracks and re-
quired administrative buildings; construction of ammunition 
Ueu.:te.na.n;t Commo.nde11. John Ca.6tellUn.e, U.S. Na.vy, Jr.ec.e.lve.d ltl6 B.S. deg1r.ee 
.i.n. Management 61tom :the. Na.val. Po.&:tgJta.dua.t:e Sc.hoof. .ln 1915. He .i..6 pJr.U ent-
.t.y a. canc:U.da,t.e. 601t. :the M.S. degJr.ee in Unde!UAJate.Jr. Ac.ot11iilcJi a.t .the Na.val. 
Po.&:tgJta.dua.t:e Sc.hoot. 
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storage area; and provide or construct associated equipment 
necessary to the use of these facilities. Opponents fear that O 
the upgrading of the island's facilities to refuel ships and 
land larger aircraft would only increase our country's mili-
tary participation in this area of the world. Additionally, 
many opponents contend that this would be interpreted by the 
Soviet Union as further proof of America's aggressive inten-
tions, and that because of such action, the naval arms race 
would accelerate. 0 
It is the contention of this paper, that an arms race 
would not necessarily ensue, nor would there necessarily be an 
increased presence of our forces. The paramount consideration 
is and should be the strategic importance of Diego Garcia. 
This paper stresses the important fact that our 50 year agree-
ment with the British to operate a logistical resupply facility 
would simply provide a "stable place to have a base." Stable, 
as used here, is a double-entendre referring to both the 
stability of our relations with Great Britai n and to t he 
stability that such a naval base would len d to the Indian 
Ocean territory. The re quested $32 million for construction 
is deemed an extremely small price when the total potential 
and flexibility of such a stable base is considered . This 
author believes that we should have an attitude similar to the 
Russians as s ummarized by W. E. Colby, Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency ; 
Moscow apparently prefers to keep a minimal force 
in the ocean that can be quickly strengthened. 
This provides a 'signaling' capability during crisis ' 
periods, while avoiding the political and economic 
costs of maintaining a larger continuous presence. 
{5:164) 
An expanded Diego Garcia could provide us with this capability. 
ARGUMENTS FAVORING EXPANSION OF DIEGO GARCIA 
There are several reasons for considering the Indian Ocean fJ 
area important to the United States and these tend to justify 
the proposed expansion of Diego Garcia. Professor Don Daniel, 
in his paper on "U.S . Policy for the Indian Ocean: The Sur-
face Ship Naval Presence Issue," classified these reasons into 
three categories - economic, maritime, and political. He 
cites three economic reasons with by far the primary considera-
tion being oil {the significance of oil cannot be underesti-
mated). Other economic considerations are the marketing of 
American goods and the potential of this area for American in-




maintaining an open flow of goods and the "freedom of the 
seas 11 philosophy. Political reasons mentioned were that a 
naval presence would demonstrate support for our allies, lend 
to the stability and security of the region, and be a response 
to the Soviet Navy build-up. 
On the surface, the above eight interests appear to un-
questionably support the expansion of Diego Garcia. However, 
it might be possible that many, if not all, of the above 
interests could be best met through economic and political en-
deavors. Indeed, it must be stated from the onset that this 
author, as well as many notable naval experts, questions the 
ability of naval power to ensure that these objectives are 
achieved. For example, the presence of American naval ships 
will not guarantee that we will receive an adequate supply of 
oil. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs James H. Noyes stated the following before 
the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs: 
One of the lessons we should have learned from 
our recent experience is that oil production and 
distribution is a delicately balanced system 
which is vulnerable to instability and military 
uncertainty. Last fall, there was a period of a 
month or so - well after the actual fighting -
when oil was available in eastern Mediterranean 
ports, but tankers were unwilling to risk the 
danger of picking it up. {9:53) 
He goes on to state that it is "not necessary to sink tankers 
to disrupt the flow of oil." (9:53) Furthermore, it is even 
doubtful that the presence of American ships on a continuous 
basis is needed to ensure that ships won't be sunk, since it 
would be relatively easy to sink an oiler with or without an 
excort, by using mines at the bottleneck entrance to the 
Persian Gulf. A decision by any country to sink an American 
oiler is of such serious magnitude that leaders must consider 
total war as a consequence. The presence of a small Navy con-
tingency is of such small consideration when compared to total 
war that its presence would probably not affect the outcome. 
Indeed, "it is inconceivable that the Soviets" (or any other 
country acting rationally) "would actually engage in or 
threaten interdiction in the absence of a general war . 11 (3:20) 
Did American ships in the area prevent the capture of the 
Mayaguez? Yet the USS CORAL SEA was off the coast of 
Cambodia within 24 hours. 
Even more significant is the uncertainty of the military 
role in general as an entity to aid in obtaining national 
goals of vital interest. The U.S. Naval War College has been 
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debating this issue extensively in recent years. A conference 
held recently at the college addressed this subject and asked 
some of the following questions: 
Can the availability and display of military force 
prevent other nations from taking actions inimical 
to our interests, or doesn ' t this work anymore? 
Is military action an acceptable means of forcing 
the removal of nonbelligerent embargoes or sanc-
tions? Would stockpiling necessary raw materials 
be preferable to an equivalent investment in mili-
tary forces? (5:487) 
The general consensus of the assembled experts in regard to 
these questions was that of uncertainty. Admiral Turner, in 
s umming up the conference, indicated that "even the most 
hawkish officers seemed to lack a clear idea of how much force 
might be employed in this era of global interdependence . " 
(5:487) Two autho r s who did take a clear-cut stand, Barry M. 
Blechman (Brookings Institution Analyst) and Arnold M. Kuzmack 
(ex-naval analyst at the Defense Department), reached a conclu-
sion that "the only strategy that promises to be effective 
against peacetime and wartime supply interruptions is the crea-
tion of national oil stockpiles." (5:488) 
All of this does not appear to support the proposal for 
expanding Diego Garcia. Has this author changed his mind in 
the middle of the paper? On the contrary, this author merely 
wishes to emphasize that there is a wide range of opinions, and 
that even most opponents of expansion have their doubts. Be-
cause of this degree of uncertainty and other reasons which 
will follow, a relatively low cost option such as Diego Garcia 
is deemed appropriate. If the cost was significantly higher, 
then such expansion would be of questionable value and would 
have to be reassessed at the new price tag. 
Among other reasons which support construction of the 
new facilities, the most important is probably the central 
location of the island. 
Diego Garcia's strategic position is evident. 
Almost equidistant from Indonesia and East 
Africa, India and Maurit i us, the i sland sits 
astride the great sea la nes from the Cape of 
Good Hope to Singapore. It is an excellent 
perch from which to observe ship traffic from 
the western Pacific to the oil-rich Persian 
Gulf and thence to the Mediterranean. (11:38) 
Another very important justification for the proposal is 








mentioned earlier in this paper. Never before have we had an 
option for building a military facility on foreign soil (in 
this area of the world) with a country whose relationship with 
ours is extremely stable. Our bases in Japan and the 
Philippines, for example, are in constant jeopardy of continued 
existence depending on political factors and prevailing social 
attitudes in those countries. Ideological, language, and 
religious differences with these countries serve as barriers 
and may lead to future confrontations. Such confrontations 
are not as likely to occur with Great Britain because we are 
more similar in these respects. Additionally, there is no in-
digenous population on the island. This coupled with the is-
land's remote location (near shipping lanes, but not other 
countries) would virtually deny any form of rebellion or riots 
that would threaten its existence. 
The logistics required to supply a carrier task force are 
extensive and recent events demonstrated further the need for 
a resupply point in the Indian Ocean. During both the Arab-
Israeli war and the India-Pakistani conflict, our task forces 
operated in the Indian Ocean. In discussing these support 
operations, Admiral Zumwalt's comments concerning the 4000 
mile supply train from Subic Bay (closest facility) are most 
impressive. 
I hasten to point out that on both occasions 
these deployments also taxed our logistics 
support capabilities to the absolute limit, 
requiring a significant reduction in our 
ability to support our forces in other key 
areas, such as the western Pacific. And 
this was in an environment when the pace of 
operations was relatively slow, and the logis-
tics support requirements correspondingly low. 
(16:28) 
In addition to the efficiency of operations which Diego Garcia 
would provide, the costs would certainly be less than those 
associated with a floating flotilla supply system. This author 
could not find a specific dollar difference that was refer-
enced in any of the sourcesi however, a figure that has been 
mentioned by Admiral Zumwalt was $400 million. This would 
include the costs required for additional ships. 
There are several other reasons for supporting the expan-
sion proposal, but these fall more naturally into a category 
of counter arguments against opposing viewpoints and will be 
discussed in the next section. 
5 
- -- ---------------
ARGUMENTS OPPOSING EXPANSION OF DIEGO GARCIA 
One of the main purposes of this section will be to dis-
pute those arguments presented by opponents to the expansion 
of Diego Garcia. Hopefully, this will again emphasize that 
opinions vary and that supporting facts can be presented by 
each side, but because of the uncertainty generated and the 
low cost involved, Diego Garcia should be expanded. 
A primary argument presented by opponents is that the ex-
pansion of Diego Garcia would encourage an acceleration in the 
naval arms race and therefore eliminate the possibility of a 
naval arms limitation agreement. Several things must be dis-
cussed in regard to this argument; however, it is this author's 
contention that such a cause and effect relationship does not 
exist. Because there might be an initial increase in the num-
ber of units deployed, does not mean that arms limitations 
cannot be achieved. An arms limitation is just that, a limita-
tion and not a ban. However, there are those that propose a 
total ban and this will be discussed shortly. 
A necessary starting point for a discussion of the 
acceleration issue requires an analysis of the Russian force 
levels and facilities in the Indian Ocean. Unfortunately, it 
is also at this point that both sides of the issue have pre-
sented slanted and misleading statistical data to support their 
viewpoints. Prior to investigating this subject, this author had 
been brainwashed by local newspapers and magazines, which pre-
sented the Zumwalt philosophy, into believing that the Indian 
Ocean had already been taken over by the Russians. Initial 
statistics counted only numbers of ships and presented a slanted 
image when such things as Russian merchant ships were tallied 
the same as American combatants . Perhaps Admiral Zumwalt was 
somewhat guilty of overacting when he stated that Russia's 
"tentacles are going out like an octopus into the Indian 
Ocean." (5:493) Furthermore, Admiral Zumwalt presented a 
rather bleak picture of the Russian facilities available 
throughout the Indian Ocean. For example. 
The Soviets have established fleet anchorages 
in several locations near the island of Socotra, 
where an airfield provides a potential Soviet 
base for reconnaisance or other aircraft. 
(16:29) 
Whereas w. E. Colby indicated to the Senate Subcommittee on 
Military Construction that the actual situation on the island 
was quite different. 
The island of Socotra, Mr. Chairman, is a bare 







for a small garrison from South Yemen • ••• The 
only airstrip on Socotra is an old World War II 
airstrip which is really not feasible for modern 
operations. (5:169) 
The opponents of Diego Garcia's expansion are no less guilty 
of citing misleading statistical data. Senator Claiborne Pell 
(Rhode Island) indicates that the United States leads the 
Soviet Union significantly in port calls. This, however, is 
like comparing apples to oranges since the nature of the calls 
are different. 
The U.S. Middle East force is engaged primarily in 
a military-diplomatic role which involves a con-
tinual round of short port calls ••• the Soviets 
visit fewer ports, concentrating on those where 
they have personnel ashore; they stay much longer, 
and their purpose usually is to provide assistance 
for Soviet programs •.• · (5:149) 
Probably the true picture of the military build-up and capabili-
ties lies somewhere between these two extremes. Still the fact 
remains that the Soviet Union has increased its Indian Ocean 
Navy from zero warships in 1968 to "6 surface combatants, 1 
submarine, 9 minesweepers, and 11 support ships" today. (5:162) 
Additionally, w. E. Colby indicates that although the develop-
ment of Diego Garcia might cause the Russian fleet to grow 
faster, he still believes that the Soviet Indian Ocean Navy 
will grow regardless of our actions. (5: 171) A steadily in-
creasing Russian Navy seems to justify some military response 
from the United States. It appears that both countries realize 
the economic importance and potential of this area and each 
intends to show its colors. 
Another argument presented by those opposed to the expan-
sion of Diego Garcia is that most of the littoral states ob-
ject to such an action. In 1971, the United Nations over-
whelmingly passed a resolution (reaffirmed in 1972, 1973, and 
1974) which asked the major powers to cease further military 
accelerations in the Indian Ocean. (3:7) However, this "Zone 
of Peace" concept would be inconsistent with the freedom of 
the high seas philosophy and would set a bad precedence. 
Furthermore, it would place the United States at a distinct 
disadvantage. 
We have no land bridge to the critical Indian 
Ocean littoral areas, as do the other great 
powers of the Eurasian landmass. We cannot 
fly to these countries except over the terri-
tory of others or along lengthy air routes 
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over water. The most efficient way we have of 
reaching them directly is by sea. (16:28) 
Additionally, several countries have privately expressed a de-
sire for our presence, although they are officially opposed so 
as not to offend their political adversaries. Even fewer 
countries object to our presence if the Soviet Union maintains 
a fleet in the Indian Ocean. 
Finally, it must be remembered that this is a remote is-
land (over 1000 miles to the nearest country) owned by the 
British. They as sovere i gns have the right to allow the United 
States to use the island for naval purposes, just as several 
countries have allowed Russia the same rights. 
A final argument used by those opposed to the expansion 
of Diego Garcia is that the Uni ted States has learned little 
from the bitter experience in Vietnam. They contend that we 
cannot _act as the "policeman of the world." This author cannot 
totally disagree with this premise; however, I cannot totally 
support it either. We must have some show of force in the area 
to demonstrate our serious concern to our allies and, hopefully, 
to improve our relations with other countries. The only alter-
native to this approach that seems available is total with-
drawa l . If our attitude is so inclined, then we should also 
withdraw from the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. It is doubt-
ful that a total isolationist attitude such as this would be 
conducive to world peace. Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, Director, 
Center for Defense Information, attempted to dispute this in 
the following analogy: 
There is a lesson that we would do well to learn 
from the Japanese. They learned the hard way, 
at great cost in blood and treasure, that there 
are means for protecting international interests 
without military force. Because they have lacked 
substantial military force that they could bring 
to bear internationally, the Japanese have become 
most adept at using diplomatic and economic means 
to protect their interests. We would do well to 
heed their experience. (5:506) 
Although this argument has great emotional appeal, it is lack-
ing in logic . True, if we could get all countries to agree to 
total disarmament, then economic and political means could 
provide this intertwining protection. But, so long as one 
country has a military force, then there must be some balanc-
ing force. Japan has been successful only because big brother 
(United States) has served as this balancing force. While the 
United States and Russia were in a military stalemate, Japan 







providing little or nothing to the military balance . It is 
highly doubtful that she could have achieved these successes 
without the United States watching over her. 
SUMMARY 
The economic potential of the Indian Ocean area is con-
0 sidered extremely important by most ~xperts today. However, 
there seems to be disagreement as to what military philosophy 
should be applied to ensure that our vital interests are not 
jeopardized. It is because of this doubt and the initial low 
cost for the construction on Diego Garcia, that this expansion 
is considered advisable. The flexibility that such a facility 
would provide should in itself be worth the initial investment. 
Finally, the stability of the island is perhaps its greatest 
asset. The importance of having a secure facility cannot be 
overly emphasized. This fact was highlighted by the recent 
(13 September 1975) kidnappings from the Naval Communications 
Station in Asmara, Ethiopia. One of the functions of an ex-
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SHOULD THE U.S. PURSUE A 
POLICY OF DEVELOPMENT AND 
DEPLOYMENT OF A STRATEGIC 
CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM 
By Rona.td J. SeJLgo:t:t 
The au:thoJL 06 :thi.6 papeJL ILO.iAu p,i.ob-lng qu.Ut.i..ott.6 c.on-
c.e/LJ1,{.ng t.he. devei..opme.n;t and de.ploymen:t 06 t.he. C/UU.6e. 
m.i.6.6.U.e. 6tJ.6t.em. PILM and c.ott.6 06 t.he. u:UUzat,i.on 06 
t.he. cJuL.i.6 e. m.i.6.6.U.e 6 y-6.tem cvi.e cll6 c.LU,.6 e.d ht a. veJLy 
t.haJLough manneJL. 
Tlu..6 pa.pelt WtU p!Le..6en:te.d t.o PJLo6U.60IL Vonald C. Va.nie.l. 
aA patr..t 06 c.oU/l.6e Ji.e.qu..iltemen:t-6 6oJL Amvu.c.an Na;Uonal 
Se.cwuty PoUc.y (GV 3061). 
ISSUE: Should the U.S. pursue a policy of development and 
deployment of a strategic cruise missile system? 
DEFINITION OF TERMS: The air launched cruise missile 
(ALCM) and the sea launched cruise missile (SLCM) are subsonic 
weapons having an air breathing, usually turbo fan, engine for 
a propulsion system rather than chemical propellants such as 
a ballistic missile. Also, as the name implies, it cruises 
or "flies" to its target and is able to attack said target 
from different altitudes, angles and directions thus differ-
ing from other missiles which are basically fired aloft to a 
certain point and allowed to descend onto their targets from 
specific ballistic angles. 
The difference in the air launched versus the sea launched 
versions lies in the encapsulating of the missile for launch 
from a submarine's torpedo tube. This involves a watertight 
protective cover around the engine air intake which breaks 
away as the missile is brought up to speed by the rocket 
booster enabling the turbo fan to sustain propulsion. Both 
missiles, aside from the protective cover, utilize essential-
ly the same airframe, engine and navigational systems. 
Ca.p.ta,,i.n Rona.t.d J. Se.1tgott, U. S. Ai.Jc. FolLc.e, JL.e.c.e.i.ved. h-i..6 B.A. degJLee ht 
Amvu.c.an H.UtoJLy 6Ji.om HobaJLt College. ht 1968. He. .U p,r.e..6e.ntl.lJ a. c.a.nc.Uda:te. 
60Jt. he. M.A. degJLe.e. in GoveJtnmen:t a.t the. Na.val Po-6,tglUldu.a,te Sc.hoot. 
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PERSPECTIVE: The cruise missile is not a newcomer to 
military armaments being used by both the Germans in their 
British campaign and the Japanese in the Pacific . The German 
"buzz bomb," even though a new and formidable weapon , depended 
upon a highly unreliable guidance system to strike its target 
and it served primarily as a terror producing weapon. The 
Japanese, on the other hand, approached the problem of guid-
ance in their cruise missiles in a rather unique way. The 
addition of a "brain," in the form of a kam i kaze pilot, served 
to solve the guidance to target problem and introduced proble ms 
of missile maneuverability to defending forces. The effect of 
kamikaze raids on United States' shipping was, in fact, rela-
tively successful co n sidering that of the 2,550 kamikaze planes 
flown, 474 resulted in hits, accounting in one 10 months period 
for almost 50% of all damage done to U.S. ships and 21% of 
U. S. ships sunk.l 
During the S0's and 60's the U.S. employed cruise missiles, 
notably the Snark, Mace and Hound Dog, in forward positions on 
the European continent. However, these earlier missiles were 
extremely slow, flew at very high altitudes for efficiency 
sake, and possessed unsophisticated navigational equipment, 
thus making their defense penetration ability almost nonexist-
ent. U.S. development beyond these relatively crude missiles 
was not pursued due to the rapid advances made in propulsion 
and guidance of ballistic weapons. On the other hand, the 
Soviets continued their cruise missile program, especially 
during the early sixties, for use by sea and air forces in both 
a tactical and strategic sense. 
The sinking of the Israeli destroyer "Eliat" during the 
1967 Mideast War by four Soviet STYX missiles was probably one 
of the reasons for the U.S. reappraisal of the role of the 
cruise missile. The fact that an extremely simple and low 
cost weapons system could pose such a threat to military, as 
well as merchant shipping, caused a sensation not only to Navy 
personnel, but also to military strategists. The second factor 
affecting cruise missile development has its roots in the SALT 
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agreements wherein the only restrictions apply to ballistic O 
missiles. Thus, a loophole exists that allows either the U.S. U • 
or the Soviets to continue development and deploymen t of 
tactical, and/or, strategic cruise missiles while still adher-
ing to the letter of the agreement. 
When seeking to define the difference between what con-
stitutes a strategic versus a tactical weapons system, one 
invariably encounters gray areas which make the drawing of 
any clear cut distinction questionable at best. For example, 
the U.S. B-52 is clearly a strategic weapons system, yet it 





So it is also true with the cruise missile weapons system. It 
can be use in limited war situations with conventional or 
nuclear warheads, and also it can serve as a deterrent to a 
power considering an attack upon U.S. forces. ("Shipboard 
missiles being used in either an anti-shipping role or against 
coastal industries and population centers) 
The Defense Department has actively pursued development 
of the ALCM and SLCM projects spending some $80 million in 
Fiscal 1974 and projecting a $132 million Naval expenditure 
in Fiscal Year 1976. 2 At the moment these price tags cover 
only the short-range Harpoon system although recent propulsion 
refinements will conceivably increase the weapon's range to be-
tween 1,300 and 2,000 nautical miles. 
ANALYSIS: In determining whether the ALCM/SLCM system 
should be developed and deployed, certain considerations must 
be dealt with, such as the advantages and disadvantages of 
the system when added to the existing weapons inventory, the 
threat posed by an enemy's capabilities, diplomatic reactions 
to development of a new system, and the incorporating of the 
system in our defense planning. 
One of the primary advantages of the proposed system is 
its size and adaptability to all types of existing weapons 
platforms. The small size of the system allows it to be used 
in a variety of modes primarily because when research contracts 
were being let to the various corporations, definite specifica-
tions were to be met thus allowing the current design to be 
used from Naval surface ships, submerged submarines, the bomb 
bays of Air Force bombers, and from mobile Army missile launch-
ers. The common usage of a single weapon by all the services 
would of necessity cut down the monetary waste of several 
individual research programs being conducted simultaneously. 
The effect of a highly sophisticated cruise missile system 
could have a definite positive impact on many existing weapons 
platforms. Probably the most impressive case for procurement 
of the SLCM is the question of Naval sea control and offensive 
operations. One must bear in mind that the cruise missile has 
a certain advantage in its slower speed in that, when using a 
terrain following/sea following radar, the navigational system 
need not be highly sophisticated to provide longer lead times 
to avoid obstacles. For example, the faster a rocket-type 
missile travels, the larger the skid radius needed for course 
changes: thus, the slower cruise missile can "fly" lower to 
the terrain/sea and make faster, more precise, adjustments to 
course without improvements in its navigation/radar capability. 
Also, this terrain hugging feature would complicate an adver-
sary's defensive capability by making the camouflaged missile 
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more difficult for an airborne interceptor to see. And even 
if the aircraft were to detect the weapon on its radar scope, 
only the u.s. is known to possess a radar look-down/shoot-down 
capability. 
Another important Naval offensive advantage of the SLCM 
is the capability of fitting it with various homing devices and 
using several attack tactics. Given the relatively slow maneu-
verability of a surface Naval vessel, a SLCM can be fitted 
with different homing devices; for example, infrared--ability 
to pick out a hot ship on a cool sea; radar--ship acting as a 
huge reflector; radio magnetic--ship as a floating erector 
set; and therefore, complicate any electronic counter measures 
the target might employ. However, one of the most striking 
features of the SLCM is its ability to attack from different 
directions and trajectories simultaneously. 
As an example, let's assume that an enemy ship is spotted 
by a patrol aircraft within range of a friendly ship's armament 
but over the horizon (more than 14 miles away) and the ship 
launches four missiles. One missile could be progr ammed to 
impact the enemy ship at the water line, and one could climb 
just prior to reaching the target and approach from a steep 
angle. The other two could be launched in a different direction 
with final commands for approach direction and impact angle 
coming from the patrol aircraft. All four of these missiles 
arriving at the same time would seriously complicate the ship's 
defensive capability. Also, the ability to shoot down a very 
low flying projectile with an extremely small frontal area by 
gun implacements is impaired due to the small envelope the gun 
would be effective in when firing at ex t reme suppression 
angles. Given the present cost of the cruise missile at 
$630,000/ missile, the firing of even 20 or 30 missiles at one 
target might be justified--especially if the target is on the 
order of the Navy's $1 billion "Nimitz" class carrier. 
In using the ALCM there are also distinct advantages from 
both a Naval and Air Force standpoint. For instance, the 
patrol plane noted above could be carrying all of the cruise 
missiles that would be necessary for a successful attack on an 
enemy ship by being able to direct the different approach 
directions and angles while maneuvering outside the range of 
enemy weapons. The Defense Department is presently exploring 
the possibility of using the older B-52 bombers in an anti-
shipping role by placing Harpoon missiles in the bomb bays 
and on the wing stations. The ability to carry many missiles, 
an extremely long loiter time, and refueling capability make 
the older bombers excellent platforms for this mission. 
Another advantage of the ALCM is to employ it as a comple-








such an attack, the Air Force initially developed the cruise 
missile to serve as a decoy to confuse enemy radar equipment 
while the B-52's penetrated. Out of this program came the 
armed version, SCAD, which performed the same functions as the 
earlier model but with an integral weapon that greatly enhanced 
the aircraft's destructive capability. The Air Force's deve-
lopment of an attack missile, SRAM, to be used in both the 
B-52 and B-1 bombers fostered reassessment of the ALCM. How-
ever, recent propulsion innovations have added more than 1,200 
nautical miles to the missile's expected range and have caused 
debate over the limited 30 nautical mile to 60 nautical mile 
range of SRAM. 
In addition to causing confusion in tracking incoming 
bomber forces and increasing fire power, the ALCM threat would 
again cause considerable detection problems by its low level 
capability. For the Soviets to counter such a threat, vast 
sums of money would have to be spent in upgrading their air 
surveillance equipment possibly at the expense of offensive wea-
pons systems. Also, using the B-52 coupled with an .ALCM sys-
tem could add years of strategic usefulness to the aging bomber 
and, with effective electronic counter measures, the need for 
rapid deployment of the B-1 could be slowed with accompanying 
savings in the defense budget. Finally, the ALCM and SLCM 
systems could serve to complement the U.S. deterrent ICBM 
force and serve as a hedge against a Soviet technological 
breakthrough which might jeopardize land based fixed launchers. 
Unfortunately, along with the systems many advantages, 
exist numerous fundamental disadvantages that must be reviewed 
before any attempted purchase of the weapons in quantity. The 
first basic problem with both the ALCM and SLCM is their 
speed, which even with Teledyne's latest engine modifications, 
is limited to .84 mach and would probably cruise to the target 
at between 200-275 kts. This low speed range would enable an 
enemy ship to acquire the missile and shoot it down with a 
system such as the Vulcan cannon (20 mm, 6000 rounds/min.) 
which is being used by U. S. ships in a radar controlled dual 
mode known as the Phalanx System. The Israelis, taking their 
lesson from the 1967 war, used the Vulcan System and electronic 
counter measures to destroy or dodge more than 50 STYX missiles 
used by the Arabs against their ships in the 1973 war. Also, 
the U.S., after slowly realizing the potential threat of an 
attack by cruise missiles, has begun conducting extensive 
testing of counter measures such as chaff dispersal upon de-
tection of a threat and the firing of rocket powered decoys to 
confuse the infrared and radar homing devices of incoming 
missiles. The very fact that the Soviets possessed these wea-
pons prior to the U.S. must lead one to the assumption of the 
Russians having at least considered some effective counter 
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measures if only against their own homing devices. Even when 
used in the air launched version, the cruise missile would 
encounter serious penetration problems not only with terminal 0 
gun defenses, but also with a n tiquated antiaircraft rockets of 
the type used in Southeast Asia. 
Along with the slowness of the ALCM is the accuracy problem 
of a weapon that must travel 1,200 to 1,400 nautical miles over 
a four to five hour period without external guidance or correc- 0 
tion. The state of the art in terrain following radar (TERCOM) 
has shown significant improvements lately using digitized 
board maps which are compared with the countryside by means of 
an external radar altimeter. However, operationally, these 
improvements in accuracy do not begin to compare with present 
day ballistic missile accuracies, and therefore, severely limit 
the type of targets the ALCM can be used against. Also, any 
improvement in accuracy would mean addition of navigational 
equipment and a corresponding decrease in warhead delivery 
capability again compounding target selection options. 
Another disadvantage of the ALCM is the usage of digital 
maps for navigation that must cover all the terrain from the 
point the missile is launched to the intended target area. The 
idea of encoding all the terrain in just one proposed route of 
1,400 nautical miles for attack against the Soviets is stagger-
ing. Whereas the usage of the ALCM against a threat from 
somewhere other than the Soviet Union (hence a less developed 
power), would make much more sense in ter ms of penetration 
probability. The mere thought of attempting to digitize all 
the terrain from which this potential threat may develop would 
mean encoding the relief of the ent i re world. The sheer magni-
tude of the undertaking and the economic expenditure would make 
any attempt of this ludicrous at best. 
The argument that the ALCM will serve to complement the 
new Air Force B-l's radar penetration ability is based on 
faulty reasoning in that the speed at which the B-1 would fly 
when attacking enemy targets is about tw i ce that of the present 
ALCM. Publishing of the design specifications and capabilities [/ 
of both systems has served to alleviate Soviet defensive 
problems and make the B-l's proposed load of 24 ALCM's easily 
discernible on radar from the aircraft. It is a foregone con-
clusion that the Air Force will push for the exotic aircraft 
rather than for a system tha t would effectively perpetuate 
its older B-52 bomber fleet. 
A clear assessment of potential enemy threat must be taken 
into account when decisions on systems procurement are to be 
made. The quantitative and qualitative build-up of the Soviet 




officers. Today's number of U.S. ships is equal to 1939 
strength levels with many vessels, particularly aircraft carri-
ers, entering their second or third decade of service. The 
same can be said of U.S. submarines while the Soviets are 
presently building new carriers, submarines (the ratio of 
Soviet to U.S. subs is approximately 3 to 1) and upgrading 
many of their fast and highly maneuverable lighter boats. 
Many of these newer ships carry updated versions of the STYX 
missile and also the Shaddock missile which climbs prior to 
target impact for a near ballistic approach. Soviet Naval 
build-up might illustrate a basic slow shift in its present 
sea denial strategy to one of sea control and any assessment 
of Russian potential would also have to include the recent con-
struction of Naval facilities by the Soviets in Somalia and the 
rumors of Soviet usage of the deep water port at Cam Ranh Bay. 
In a strategic sense, the SLCM used in either the sea denial 
or the sea control role is a formidable weapon that must be 
developed and deployed without the slightest hesitation. 
In addition to potential threat considerations, there are 
also many underlying diplomatic and Defense Department rationale 
for acquiring a weapons systems such as the ALCM/SLCM. The re-
cent shift in U.S. strategic targeting from one of counter 
value to that of counter force is in fact an inevitable one 
given current U.S. policy makers. In January, 1951, the 
Congressman from Michigan, Gerald Ford, demanded on the House 
floor that the White House and State Department bomb deep in-
side China to help American troops in Korea. "First and fore-
most we must bomb the Chinese Communist supply bases in China 
itself ••• The fallacy of fighting the hordes of Asia on the 
ground is obvious. We are bleeding ourselves to death, which 
is just what Stalin wants us to do. It is utter stupidity to 
continuj such a policy when we are not fighting with both 
fists." Asked on June 25, 1975, at his press conference if 
nuclear weapons would be used in Korea he said, "I am not 
either confirming or denying it. I am saying we have the 
forces and they will be used in our national interest as they 
should be. 114 
Secretary of State Kissinger, in his 1957 book, Nuclear 
Weapons and Foreign Policy, stated, "With proper tactics, 
nuclear war need not be as destructive as it appears when we 
think of it in terms of traditional warfare. Without damage 
to our interest, we could announce that Soviet aggression 
would be resisted with nuclear weapons if necessary; that in 
resisting we would not use more than 500 kiloton explosive 
power unless the enemy used them first; that we would use 
'clean' bombs •.• Unless the enemy violated the understanding ••• " 
Also he states, "In limited war ev~rything depends on daring 
and leadership of a higher order." He contends that a limited 
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nuclear war does not guarantee success by itself but it would 
use the sociological, technological and psychological advan-
tages of the United States to best effect. 
Defense Secretary Sc h lesinger wrote in 1960, "We have not 
reconciled ourselves emot i onally to the need for the continual 
exercise of power to protect our interests .. • We must become 
adjusted t o the heavy costs of limite d warfare as a condition 
of life ••• 116 And before the House Armed Services Committee on 
September 30, 1974, he stated, "I do not believe that the use 
of nuclear weapons is addictive, 117 in seeking to explain his 
contention that limited nuclear exchanges would not lead to 
all out incineration. 
Each of these statements points toward a more surgical 
interpretation of U.S. targeting doctrine. Also Secretary 
Schlesinger seemed to imply that the Soviets should not be the 
only ones to be concerned by his statement that these weapons 
could "provide a threat of response to certain aggressive acts 
which everybody will understand."8 The ALCM/SLCM low-cost and 
low-yield warhead would be an excellent weapon to fire on un-
defended soft targets and probably would fit neatly into these 
strategy postures. But is the system needed? Can existing 
weapons systems be altered or modified to perform the same 
functions of ALCM/SLCM and be just as effective? This writer's 
answer is that the long range ALCM/SLCM is a waste of effort 
for minimal returns, while the shorter range missile is definite-
ly needed by Naval forces to counter the quantum leap in sea 
based weapons made by the Soviet Navy. 
The proposed mission of the long range ALCM/SLCM to extend 
bomber range, confuse enemy radar, and strike at undefended 
targets can be accomplished by the already operational SRAM 
missile carried by both the B-52 and B-1. This missile has 
the added advantage of having an extremely high penetration 
airspeed (greater than Mach 2) thus complicating enemy defenses . 
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The argument that the ALCM/SLCM would fit neatly into a 
more flexible world-wide targeting strategy and could be used [] 
more readily in a small nuclear exchange is also questionable. 
Any number of the more than 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons 
located throughout the world could be launched by aircraft, 
ship or army units in such an event. Also, Minuteman ICBM's 
and SLBM's could be used with either a single or MIRVed warhead 
condition for one target or for perhaps several targets. It 
is highly unlikely if an ICBM were launched in defense of U.S. 
troops toward Africa , for example, and the Soviets were noti-
fied beforehand, that the result would be an all-out exchange 
of weapons between the super powers. The ability to wash a 




within 36 minutes to hit new ones adds a degree of flexibility 
in warmaking no former president has had. In addition to rapid 
retargeting, another degree of flexibility is afforded our pol-
icy makers in determining the explosive potential of missiles 
already in their silos. This lies in the ability to change the 
yield of the individual warheads at any time prior to actual 
launch of the missile. Thus in a limited nuclear situation 
the yield can be made to fit the intended target. Firing a 
few of these ICBM's in a limited war would not detract from 
our strategic deterrent capability. (Five or six warheads 
would in no way threaten depletion of our present 8,000 
strategic warhead force.) Also, the proposed new developments 
in ICBM propulsion would greatly increase its range and might 
possibly preclude the development of systems such as the ALCM/ 
SLCM. To ignore usage of our ICBM force as a tactical as well 
as strategic weapon limits our offensive options and flexibili-
ty and this tunnel vision causes vast expenditures of money 
for new systems when all that is needed is to reload and re-
program the old ones. 
The argument to pursue the cruise missile programs because 
they are not limited by SALT I or II and could be used as a 
bargaining chip in future talks is also dangerous reasoning. 
In the first place, the bargaining chip argument has been used 
by Defense and State Department officials alike to serve as 
justification for exotic weapons systems such as ABM costing 
hundreds of millions of dollars which have an uncanny way of 
becoming indispensable once deployment has begun. Severe 
resistance to giving up these multimillion dollar contracts 
is brought to bear from throughout the economy. Labor unions 
are concerned with high employment. The industrial complex 
is concerned with growth and profits. Finally, the military, 
being organized on an industrial pattern, actively seeks 
growth, expansion and progress. All these forces added togeth-
er exert tremendous influence to continue a weapons system 
once a decision is made to develop it--if only for use as a 
"bargaining chip." 
The fact that the letter and not the spirit of SALT is 
loose upon the super powers seems to be a fair statement 
especially when considering the Soviet violations of the 
Accords and Defense Department arguments for new weapons 
systems such as ALCM/SLCM. The Soviets have recently completed 
testing of their SA-5 radar sites against simulated trajector-
ies of ballistic missiles even though the SALT I Accord for-
bids testing of equipment other than that which is located on 
the periphery of the country. The knowledge gained by this 
testing could turn over 11,000 of their antiaircraft missiles 
into an impressive ABM complex. Also, the building of over 
150 hardened command and control centers along the Trans 
19 
Siber i an Ra i lway, that happen to have the exact dimensions of 
their biggest launcher, the SS-X-18, and blow-off doors, is 
more than coi n cidence and seems to force the U.S. into a re-
spo n se.9 
Howeve r , when viewed through the looking glass the Soviets 
might perceive different U.S. intentions than those our spokes-
men profess. For example, the U.S. insistence on developing 
the ALCM/SLCM without restrictions on range, and U.S. refusal 
to negotiate the counting of aircraft carrying ALCM's against 
the MIRVed ceiling of 1,320, even though the Soviets have 
asked for such bargaining, might illustrate a possible U.S. 
unwillingness to accept strategic parity and continue to seek 
superiori t y. The verification problem associated with small 
cruise missiles is another stumbling block to any effective 
arms limitation agreement if they are to be considered strate-
gic, there is no way short of actual physical inspection to 
determine how many cruise missiles a ship might be carrying. 
Any truly meaningful steps toward arms reductions, if that 
in fa c t is our goal, is going to have to start by both par t ies 
giving up deeply entrenched systems. By at least offering to 
give up the strategic ALCM/SLCM system for a like Soviet sys-
tem, the U. S. forfeits a marginal system that truly concerns 
Soviet policy makers and by doing so establishes a willingness 
to at least partia l ly limit the weapons spiral. Obviously, any 
U.S. action would have to be met with correspon d ing Soviet ac-
tion if any degree of trust is to be fostered and the strategic 
cruise missile is, in this writer's opinion, one of the most 
lucrative places for concessions. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1. Continue development and deployme n t of the SLCM and 
ALCM for immediate use by the Navy and Air Force for purposes 
of sea denial and/or sea control . 
0 
0 
2 . Continue to employ common subsystems within the wea-
pon which would allow rapid integration into any forces' [) 
tactical striking arm. 
3. Limit the ALCM/SLCM range to 300 na u tical miles. In 
this way, the system could not be construed as an integral 
part of our strategic deterrent force. 
4. Deploy the missile as a conventional weapon while re-
taining the option to arm it with a nuclear warhead. 
5. Discontinue development of the long range ALCM/SLCM 




spiral of weapons systems procured as "bargaining chips" that 
are costly, of questionable value, and tend to become en-
trenched once technological problems are solved. 
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Introduction: 
In the past few years sensitivity training has gained 
widespread attention from organizations and individuals; and 
yet, there are many in the management field who, although 
having heard of sensitivity training, have no clear idea of 
what this type of training entails. Further, many know that 
a controversy concerning sensitivity training exists, but do 
not know specifically what is involved in the controversy. 
It is more than merely debating whether sensitivity training 
is good or bad. It is our intent to give the reader an idea 
of just what sensitivity training is, how it is used, what 
its effectiveness has been, and what the military implications 
are, if any, of this type of training. Although several 
variations of sensitivity training exist, we are restricting 
ourselves to organization use of sensitivity training. 
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This paper is divided into t hree major parts. Part one 
deals with the definitions of sensitivity training . and its 
objectives. Part two is on its e ff ectiveness, and part three 
has to do with its applications both in industry and within 
the military. 
Concepts of Sensitivity Trai n ing 
The individual cannot exist without the organiza-
tion and the organization depends tremendo u sly upon 
the individual. In order to optimize the relation-
ship between the two entities, past organizational 
strategy has been centered around developing indiv-
iduals who are happy, satisfied, and have high 
morale. (Sca n lan, 1971: p. 546) 
Individuals with commitment and self-worth, who are fully 
functioning, productive, and self-responsible, seem to be the 
type of individuals organizations are presently trying to deve-
lop. To satisfy this objective, decentralization, or delegat-
ing authority and responsibility down to the lowest possible 
level has met with some success. Decisions then are made at 
the lowest possible point in organ iz a t ion, thus involving the 
individual to the greater extent. 
Scanlan (1971) pointed out that for decentralization to 
work, open superior-subordinate relationships are required, 
where trust is high, when conformity, fear, and dependence are 
low, and where experimentation and risk-taking are prominent. 
Ernest Dale (1961) suggests that the lack of free d i scussion, 
openness, and trust among management has reached the point 
where it can be a primary cause for management to lose its 
claim to legitimacy. 
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Sensitivity training is a very controversial method dis-
cussed by educators, and organizations executives to develop 
and strengthen these values of trust, self-esteem, openness, 
and internal commitment. This subject has been of prime con-
cern to people in the personnel and training and development [] 
profession in the past and undoubtedly will re main so for many 
years to come. 
What is Sensitivity Training? Sensitivity Training falls 
under a variety of different titles such as Laboratory or T-
Group Training. Matthew Miles (1962) describes sensitivity 
training as "intensive group self-study procedures •• • designed 
to bring about increased sensitivity and s k ill in relations 
to social-psychological phenomena occurring in interpersonal 




Scanlan (1971) explains sensitivity training as a rela-
tively unstructured group in which individuals participate as 
learners. The learning comes from the individuals and their 
immediate experiences within the group. This group experience 
requires that the learners understand their internal needs, 
values, perceptions, and resources. Therefore, sensitivity 
training focuses on learning about one's self and one's ways 
of relating to other persons and/or groups by learning direct-
ly from an experience with others. Interpersonal competence 
is probably one of the best phrases to sum up sensitivity 
training and as a result of training, hopefully, the individual 
will be able to interact more effectively with others in his 
environment. 
as 
Buchanan (1964) explains laboratory or T-Group training 
(1) a face-to-face, largely unstructured group as 
a primary vehicle for learning, (2) planned activi-
ties involving interaction between individuals and/ 
or between groups, (3) systematic and frequent 
feedback and analysis of information regarding what 
happened in the here-and-now and what effect it had, 
(4) dilemmas or problems for which "old ways" of 
behaving for most of the participants do not provide 
effective courses of action {and thus for which 
innovative or "search" behavior is required), and 
(5) generalization, or reformulation of concepts 
and values based upon the analysis of direct experi-
ences. 
Both Buchanan's {1964) and Miles' (1962) defintions are 
very close and the relationships between laboratory training, 
T-Group training, and sensitivity training are assumed to be 
the same for the purpose of this paper. It should be noted, 
however, that there are different definitions of laboratory 
training, T-Group training and sensitivity training and care 
should be taken as to which definitions are being used. 
In summary, a brief statement would say that sensitivity 
training is designed to help individuals become aware of, 
and own up to their feelings, values, and ideas, and to in-
crease their individuality, nonconformity, self-responsibility, 
and internal connnitment. It is often associated with hard 
work, pain, discomfort, conflict, tension, and £rustration. 
Schein and Bennis (1965} describe three basic dimensions 
which are used to define sensitivity training. The first 
dimension being what the learning is about. The training 
experience can be organized to focus on (1) the person him-
self (his feelings, reactions of others, and his impact on 
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others); (2) how people and small groups operate, the dynamics 
of being a group member (what does it mean to a manager, 
teacher, or nurse); (3) the dynamics of social systems (how 0 
groups are organized and relate to each other), and on the 
dynamics of organizations. 
The second dimension is in the forms of levels of learning. 
The levels can be identified in a hierarchy; order of aware-
ness (lowest), attitude change (middle), and increased compe- O 
tence (the highest). 
The third dimension refers to the important difference 
between laboratories which are organized to help individuals 
learn and grow as people and those which influence an entire 
organization or some sub-unit of it. 
Sensitivity Training vs Group Therapy 
There is sometimes confusion between sensitivity training 
and group therapy. There are many similarities between them, 
yet there are also considerable differences which would be 
clarified (Bradford, Gi bb, and Beene, 1964). 
Both groups are c oncerned with increasing sensitivity of 
the members to their own functioning and to that of the other 
members at the same time correcting blind spots and distor-
tions. Both stress learning to communicate accurately and more 
effectively with others and both use a basically unstructured 
situation . The objective of ego-strengthening and improving 
the self-image along with the development of insight and 
opportunities for reality-testing are found in both. 
Sensitivity groups which emphasize or focus on the 
individual and have as a goal the development and strengthen-
ing of individual traits would have fewer differences in com-
parison with psychotherapy groups but, in general, therapy 
groups are composed of people seeking relief from distress, 
while sensitivity groups are composed of individuals trying 
to learn new skills. Therapy groups attempt to modify more () 
pervasive and more central attitudes and put relatively more CJ 
emphasis on unlearning old modes of behavior as compared to 
learning new ones. They also take considerably longer to 
achieve their goals and ob jectives. 
The objective of sensitivity groups is improving the 
functioning of the individual in his relationship with others , 
while the therapy group's objective is to relieve neurotically 
caused distress in the individual (Scanlan, 1971: p. 549). 
It should be pointed out that the sensitivity training 





organization seeks for its employees, and not that which the 
individual seeks for his own well-being. 
Conditions and Techniques for Sensitivity Training 
In a study by the National Training Laboratory (NTL) (1970; 
p. 2), the following conditions were set: (1) Presentation of 
Self, (2) Continuous feedback, (3) Atmosphere of trust, (4) 
Cognitive map, (5) Experimentation, (6) Practice, (7) Appli-
cation, and (8) Relearning how to learn. Sensitivity training 
has as its task improving the learning of each individual. 
For feedback to follow presentation of self, an appropriate 
climate needs to be developed. Legitimate opportunities for 
individuals to try out new ways of behaving need to be present. 
Sensitivity training is designed to meet these conditions. 
Sensitivity training is an experience in social creativi-
ty. Individuals face the task, within a relatively short but 
concentrated period of time, of creating, developing, and main-
taining a small social organization under unusual conditions. 
This emerging social organization faces real, hard-headed 
problems of social formation, individual relationships, and 
work achievement. 
Sensitivity training in its beginning has absent, blurred 
or ambiguous such fundamental ingredients of social organiza-
tion as authority and power structure, processor of goal forma-
tion, norms of personal and group behavior, procedures for 
productive work, and expectations for leader and member behavi-
or. These vacancies must be filled or reduced through the hard 
work of the group members. Their work efforts provide material 
for a variety of learnings, the process of developing a group 
in which to learn becomes the means for achieving learning. 
While sensitivity training is sometimes looked on as a 
miniature society, it does have aspects not typically found 
in social organizations. Very rarely in life is one in on the 
creation of a segment of society. People are born into fami-
lies where structures and organization are present. They are 
taught and learn to accept rules, customs and laws. If one 
is starting a new organization, he generally follows past 
traditions. 
As sensitivity training groups struggle with their 
problems of formations, of goal clarification, and of individu-
al difficulties in working out patterns adequate for both the 
individual and the group, the learning emphasis could be 
focused on the development of cultural norms in the group, on 
the process of social organization, on the dynamics of group 
behavior, on interpersonal relationships, on individual per-
ceptual and motivational systems, or on individual and group 
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value systems. One cannot unders t and group forces without 
understanding, at the same time, one's own relationships in 
the group. 0 
To a large extent, sensitivity training groups create 
their own textbook and read it simultaneously. A big problem 
for the groups and their trainers is to know which parts of 
the text to study intensively. One of the most important as-
pects of this training is the creating and analyzing of human 0 
data and helping people learn how to read the human behavioral 
data they are continuously producing, and equally important, 
learning how to help one another to read. 
In summary, sensitivity training is used for individual 
learning purposes where the data are created and analyzed by 
group work, uninterrupted from the outside, and interpreted 
by an instructor. The learning is a group task entered joint-
ly and the trainer does not deny the group ' the experience of 
creating a nd maintaining their own group even though this ex-
perience will be difficult and may produce anxiety. Schein 
and Bennis (1965) describe the overall process as follows: 
How the T-Group goes about its business of creating 
learning opportu n ities during the first and subse-
quent sessions is hard to characterize because each 
group has its own unique history. It has its own 
particular combination of people; its own particu-
lar trainer with his own theory of learning and 
style of intervention; its unforeseen incidents, 
dilemmas, and crises. It creates, for each member, 
a unique set of emotional and intellectual experi-
ences. 
Most human behavior expresses str i ving for emo-
tional satisfaction or the avoidance of emotional 
threats. We act to move toward what we want and 
away from what we fear or dislike. Even behavior 
which seems unemotional usually serves emotional 
ends. For example, routine habits often become 
intr i nsically satisfying. Men become irrationally 
attached to familiar objects and annoyed if they 
can't have their customary coffee cup, fountain 
pen, newspaper, or easy chair. (Allport, Gordon, 
1960) • 
Problems arise because emotions are ill-used. People 
get into trouble because of mistaken attempts to repress, dis-
tort, or d i sguise their true emotions. A common mistake is 
to ignore the emotional factors which in turn sometimes causes 
working groups to i gnore feelings. The test of a good deci-
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group work, uninterrupted from the outside, and interpreted 
by an instructor. The learning is a group task entered joint -
ly and the trainer does not deny the group the experience of 
creating and maintaining their own group even though this ex-
perience will be difficult and may produce anxiety. Schein 
and Bennis (1965) describe the overall process as follows: 
How the T-Group goes about its business of creating 
learning opportunities duri ng the first and subse-
quent sessions is hard to characterize because each 
group has its own unique history. It has its own 
particular combination of people; its own particu-
lar trainer with his own theory of learning and 
style of intervention; its unforeseen incidents, 
dilemmas, and crises. It creates, for each member, 
a unique set of emotional and intellectual experi-
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Most human behavior expresses striving for emo-
tional satisfaction or the avoidance of emotional 
threats. We act to move toward what we want and 
away from what we fear or dislike. Even behavior 
which seems unemotional usually serves emotional 
ends. For example, routine habits often become 
intrinsically satisfying. Men become irrationally 
attached to familiar objects and annoyed if they 
can ' t have their customary coffee cup, fountain 
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expressed, recognized, and taken into account. Innumerable 
business decisions are bad because they have been devised 
on the assumption that feelings can be laid aside or ignored. 
A second common mistake is to disguise certain feelings and to 
act as if they were different in quality from what they ~re. 
The distortion is almost always in the direction of some fake 
model regarded as socially desirable. It is not surprising, 
then, that people who for years have pretended to others that 
they feel what they don't really feel, should lose their 
ability to discriminate among their own emotions. 
One of sensitivity training's greatest values is that of 
feedback which comes from one another in the unusually frank 
atmosphere. Through feedback we find our feelings which are 
more apparent to others than to us. A model of sensitivity 
training called the Johari Window is shown below 
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As we become more frank, we move some feelings from the hidden 
area toward the open. As our fellow group members become more 
frank, they reveal to us our own feelings which we have failed 
to recognize. Another problem seen with the emotional side 
of personality is its tendency to overdo one pattern of satis-
faction or another. 
Richard Wallen gives an illustration when he talks about 
three familiar types of managers: The Tough Battler, The 
Friendly Helper, and the Objective Thinker who has tried to 
























































































love and to 
fight 
On the chart above are shown characteristic emotions, 
goals, standards of evaluation, techniques of influence of 
each type, and his service to the organization. Each can be 
overdone and distorted . The Tough Battler would prove to be 
a more satisfied person if he could learn some sensitivity, 
accept his own inevitable dependence on others, and come to 
enjoy consideration for them. The Friendly Helper would im-
prove if he could stand up for his own interests and for what 
is right, even against the pleas of others. He needs firmness 
and strength and courage not to evade or to smooth over con-






improve if he could become more aware of his own feelings and 
the feelings of others around him. He needs to learn that 
0 there are times when it is all right to fight and times when it 







~ Tough Battler 
It is almost impossible to be a pure type of the three 
but most of us fall inside a triangle (Fig. 1). If we are too 
far off center sensitivity training gives us a chance to 
rectify our human balance. This can be done in a relatively 
safe environment of the group and we can experiment with be-
haviors rather than the opposite of those on which we have 
too often relied. If we become sensitive to our own inner 
impulses we shall not need external sticks and carrots to 
motivate us toward a fuller, richer, better life. 
Effectiveness of Sensitivity Training 
Part two of this paper is concerned with the question ••• 
is sensitivity training effective, and if it is, is it worth 
the effort and expense? Determining the effectiveness of 
any training program can be difficult, and this is especially 
true of sensitivity training. Merely recalling to mind the 
generally accepted goals of sensitivity training will bring 
out this point. The goals focus on three areas; (1) The 
individual - his feelings and his relationship with others, 
(2) The dynamics of group organization and behavior, (3) The 
dynamics of social systems. It is one thing to evaluate 
0 specific training goals such as fixing a radio or performing o celestial navigation and quite another to evaluate such ab-
stract things as attitudes, sensitivity, and awareness. 
A major factor to bear in mind when considering the 
effectiveness of sensitivity training is the expense of con-
ducting it. The number of people in a sensitivity group must 
be small, usually no more than fifteen . The tra i ning is nor-
mally conducted away from the normal work environment, and 
since this type of training is normally given to first line 
supervisors and above, their salaries must be considered 
as a significant expense. (McGehee & Thayer, 1961) 
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An additional factor to be considered in the sensitivity 
training controversy is the possible undesirable effects it 
may have on individual participants. This po i nt is answered 
by Argyris (Business Week, 1963} who cites NTL statist i cs that 
show on l y four nervous breakdowns out of 10,000 partic i pants, 
and all four of these individuals had a prior h istory of 
psychiatric problems. Opponents of sensitivity training 
counter that the validity of this training method has not been 
demonstrated and because there are risks of personal psychologi-
cal damage, sensit i vity training shoul d not be offered at this 
time on a commercial basis. The opponents further argue that 
sensitivity training is manipulative in nature and that the 
methodology is an invasion of personal privacy. {House, 1967) 
Due to the nature of the beast, the methodology used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of sensitivity train i ng is a major 
problem. One approach advanced by House (1967) is to classify 
the evaluation variables into four categories; (1) objectives 
of the training, (2) initial states of the learner, (3) ini-
tial states of the organization}, (4) methods of inducing 
change in the learner. He considers the ob j ectives of training 
as output variables, the initial states of the organization and 
i ndividual as moderator variables, and the methods of inducing 
change as the input variables. He the n constructs a matrix of 
relationships between variables. His assertio n is that this 
matrix relationship can be used to assess the "person dimen-
sion" change of organization performance. House's approach 
points out that no evaluation of training effectiveness is 
likely to be successful if it ignores the variables in the 
situation as well as variables in the individual. Buchanan 
(1969) points out that although this approach has considerable 
merit, it falls short on its treatment of output variables. 
For example, House lists changes in knowledge, skill, and 
attitude as output variables, but no organizational factors 
are included. The organization that supports this training 
is doing so on the assumption that this training will result 
in increased productivity. Therefore, Buchanan feels that 
the output factors must be strengthened in this approach. 
There are several specific problems of designing an 
evaluation mechanism for sensitivity training. The first 
problem is the difficulty of randomly assigning persons to a 
training group and a control group. Usually they are self-
selected or else are assigned for administrative reasons. 
Additionally, generally little data is available with respect 
to the control group during the period of evaluation. (Harrison, 
1967) There is one further diffic ulty in the use of control 
groups; merely being a member of a group influences expecta-
tions thereby introducing bias, if perceptions of behavior 







A second problem in evaluation is the timing of the 
evaluation. The immediate effect on sensitivity training 
students may be feelings of uncertainty or discomfort. These 
feelings may be replaced in time by acceptance of new behavior 
patterns and increased confidence in the participant. An 
evaluation conducted immediately after the completion of train-
ing may give vastly different results from one conducted six 
months or a year after the completion of training (Harrison, 
1967) • 
Other problems associated with an evaluation technique 
include the assignment of weighting factors to observed 
changes. For example, how much weight should be given to 
minor desirable changes in an individual as opposed to major 
changes such as increased effectiveness on the job. It is, 
for the most part, difficult to compare various studies of 
effectiveness in determining the right approach. This is 
caused by the fact that no two studies are ever exactly alike. 
The course length may be different, the training groups may 
have been selected using different criteria, the evaluators 
themselves may be slightly subjective in their evaluations. 
(Buchanan, 1969) 
The reason for dwelling on some of the difficulties 
associated with the valuation of sensitivity training is be-
cause we are going to discuss now what the evaluations reveal. 
Most decision-makers like to assemble all the available facts 
relevant to a situation, weigh the consequences of each course 
of action, and then make a decision. Assembling the available 
facts regarding sensitivity training is a difficult, if not 
impossible, task. There are facts to support the proponents 
of sensitivity training, and facts to support the opponents. 
The best we can do is present a general consensus of opinion 
of the effects of sensitivity training and point out areas that 
are in dire need of further research effort. 
Sensitivity training produces anxiety in the participants, 
but this anxiety is an intended part of the training (House, 
1967). The participant comes away from the training program 
with some new ideas about himself and his relationship to 
other people. If he eventually accepts some of these new 
ideas, they may aid him in building better relationships with 
his superiors and with his subordinates. Hopefully, he'll 
become a more effective communicator, primarily through more 
objective listening. 
Sensitivity training, by itself, is not enough (Buchanan, 
1969). The benefits from this type of training are completely 
dependent on the nature of the organization itself. Before a 
company commits itself to sensitivity training, it must con-
sider its overall organizational objectives and determine 
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whether or not sensitivity training will help attain those 
goals. Once the decision has been made to use sensitivity 0 
training, the orga n ization must consider the requirements for 
achieving the desired results. These requirements can be 
discussed with respect to the three training phases: pre-
training, ongoing training an d post-training. In the pre-
training phase, sensitivity training must have the full support 
of top management. If the participant feels that the company 
considers this training vitally important, he'll feel that his 0 
selection for sensitivity training is to help him succeed with 
the company, rather than have the feeling that he is being cut 
out of the company for several weeks to give someone else a 
chance at his job. The company must commit itself to a 
supportive atmosphere, otherwise the trainee is not likely to 
be willing to try out some of the ideas he brings back to the 
company. In the ongoing training phase, the company must be 
willing to plan for uninterrupted attendance by the partici-
pants. Preferably, the training should be accomplished away 
from the company. One of the most important responsibilities 
of the company falls in this area - the competency of the 
training staff. Cutting corners in this area will probably 
lead to failure of the whole program more than any other single 
factor. As was pointed out earlier, sensitivity training 
runs very close to group therapy in many respects, and poten-
tially harmful consequences can result with an incompetent 
staff. The company must be willing to allow for adequate time 
for training. How much time is required for training is still 
not clear, and this area requires further study. Indications 
are that several days is about the minimum and the most desir-
able length may be several months. In the post-training phase, 
the company must be p r epared for the new ideas and experimenta-
tion that is likely to develop. The l evel of management just 
above the one that has undergone sensitivity training must be 
willing to change its behavior. Traditional ways of doing 
things are likely to be challenged. Everyone in the management 
chain-of-command must be willing to listen to these new ideas 
and be willing to try them out if they seem feasible. If this 
supportive atmosphere does not prevail in the company, it is O 
probable that the trainees will revert back to the standard o 
way of doing things and the whole training e f fort will be a 
failure (Scanlan, 1971) . 
One of the most glaring deficiencies in currently avail-
able literature is the lack of any effectiveness measures of 
sensitivity training from the organization's point of view. 
Perhaps this criticism will be considered unfair. As was 
pointed out, evaluating this type of trai n ing is very diffi-
cult and sufficient information in the right form is not avail-
able to go beyond tentative evaluations of sensitivity training 




it will be even more difficult than individual evaluation, 
sensitivity training must be looked at from the organization's 
point of view. The company is paying the bill - expecting to 
get an increase in productivity from its investment in a train-
ing program. At the present time the organization must base 
its decision to use sensitivity training on the hope that the 
desirable effects of sensitivity training do in fact lead to 
a more effective and efficient organization. This may or may 
not be the case - only evaluation programs on a broader scale 
than present ones will give the answer. Bass (1968) says the 
following on this subject: 
We still may hear complaints about the lack of 
evaluation of sensitivity training, yet a bib-
liography of at least 50 evaluative studies now 
exists •.• why have these studies failed to 
impress social scientists? ••• A major reason 
may be because insufficient attention has been 
devoted to the purposes of the evaluation and 
the public for whom the · evaluation is being 
prepared. 
In summing up his views on sensitivity training, House 
(1967) posed four ·questions to managers contemplating the use 
of sensitivity training in an organization. Hopefully, these 
questions will aid the manager in determining if sensitivity 
training will help the organization attain its specific goals. 
The first question asks, "Are the changes that a T-Group in-
duces the kind required for more effective leader behavior?" 
There is fairly conclusive evidence to support the view that 
sensitivity training can make a person a better listener, 
less dependent, a more considerate manager, and a more sensi-
tive person. These attributes can lead to effective leader-
ship in some organizations. However, there is also evidence 
that these attributes do not always lead to more effective 
organizational performance. House poses the question, "Should 
combat sergeants have these characteristics to command effect-
ively in the field?" The point is the situation may be the 
predominant factor in what kind of attributes in a leader are 
most effective. While sensitivity and consideration are cer-
tainly desirable traits in a leader, they are by no means the 
only ones and are certainly not possessed by many great leaders. 
A major determination in what makes good leadership is the 
leadership style used by the superior and the goals, ambitions 
and attitudes of the subordinates. Dr. Warren Bennis (1963), 
and advocate pf sensitivity training says this: 
It is not possible at this point to be certain 
whether these new organizational values lead to 
improved performance ••• for example, these new 
change-induction processes emphasized openness 
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rather than secrecy, superior-subordinate collab-
oration rather than dependency or rebellion, in-
ternal rather than external commitment, team 
l eadership rather than a one to one vertical rela-
tionship, authentic relations h ips rather than 
direction or coercion, and so on. What then 
happens to status or power? What about those 
individuals who have a low need for participation 
and/or a high need for structure and dependence? 
And, what about those personal needs for power or 
aggression? In short, what about those needs which 
can be expressed and best realized in a bureau-
cratic mechanism? Are these people expected to be 
changed through some transformation of needs, or are 
they expected to yield to a concept of human nature 
incompatible with their own needs? 
The main factor to consider in the context of this question is 
not that the evidence thus far supports the hypothesis that 
sensitivity training produces a change in individuals, but 
whether or not these changes result in a desirable effect on 
the company and the individual which depends to a great ex-
tent on the norms of the company. 
0 
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House's second question to the manager is, "Can the 
org~nizat i on tolerate the changes in the individual if the 
T-Group is successful?" If an individ ual, after sensitivity 
training, has values that are different from the values of the 
individuals he must work with, conflicts will probably arise. 
He may become dissatisfied with his job as a result of sensi-
tivity training. Another point to consider while considering 
this question is the fact that sensitivity t raining can lead 
to an individual having his opinion lowered concerni ng the use 
of initiation structure. However, Ohio State Leadership 
Studies {Stogdill & Coons, 1957) have repeatedly shown that 
superiors evaluate highly those subordi n ates who are high in 
initiation structure. Although these studies may be disre-
garded by some because of their age, there may exist more 




The third question is, "Can the candidate tolerate the 
anxiety involved in the T-Group process?" Generally, the 
individuals considered for sensitivity training are adults 
who have already established behavior patterns and are comfort-
able with them. Sensitivity training, as we ha~e said earlier, 
produces anxiety in that the individual has to take a hard look 
at his current values - he must question them under the stress 
of interpersonal feedback . If the i ndividual could possibly be 






Participation should be on a strictly voluntary basis, and the 
manager should attempt to determine if the individual has per-
sonal problems such as family difficulties, which might make 
sensitivity training potentially dangerous. 
The fourth question the manager should ask is, "What are 
the credentials of the T-Group leader?" Among the people and 
organizations conducting sensitivity training, there is a wide 
range of competence and experience. The manager, along with 
the person being considered to conduct the training must care-
fully consider whether his credentials qualify him to lead 
sensitivity training under the given circumstances. 
As we stated before, sensitivity runs closely parallel to 
methods presently used in the modern therapeutic process even 
though some may claim that sensitivity training is not thera-
peutic in nature. Sensitivity training leaders should possess 
psychological training equivalent to that required for a clini-
cal psychologist. Many individuals are presently conducting 
sensitivity training with credentials far short of this, and 
they may allow individuals to go beyond a safe point in the 
anxiety producing process. In short, they may induce problems 
that they are unequipped to recognize and unable to handle. 
Naval Applications 
At the present time, the Navy's use of sensitivity train-
ing is, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. It is true 
that several learning experiments using sensitivity training 
have been conducted with positive results reported by the 
trainers. Cook, Hahn & Sheppard (1971) did a study which in-
cluded 23 Navy Medical Service Officers. They took part in a 
three and one-half day management style seminar. A six month 
intervening period at a duty station followed; then a two and 
one-half day management style session was conducted. The 
Management Value Index (MVI) was given at the beginning and 
end of the first session, and at the end of the second session 
with the results indicating course influence. It was also 
pointed out that an on-the-job "incubation period 11 was needed 
in order for attitudes to change. Bergman & Siegel (1972) did 
consider the possible Hawthorne effect bias that may have 
influenced the results. This study bears out what has been 
shown in the civilian connnunity - namely that sensitivity 
training does produce a change in the individual. 
The four questions that House proposed to civilian managers 
concerning the use of sensitivity training should be kept in 
mind by Navy managers before deciding whether or not sensitivity 
training will produce a long term desirable effect on the Navy. 
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The first thing to consider is whether or not the changes 
in leadership behavior brought about by sensit i v i ty training 
will be beneficial in terms of the overall objectives of the 
Navy. As was mentioned earlier, sensitivity training causes 
trainees to have a lower regard for a structural organization . 
Generally, most military organizations in the past have been 
highly structural. Will less structured ones be as effective 
or even more effective? 
The Navy manager must also consider, when contemplating 
the use of sensitivity training, the size of the organization . 
We have stated that the evidence gathered thus far seems to 
indicate that sensitivity training will only be effective when 
the whole organization is committed to change. Sensitivity 
training at the unit level can lead to problems . For example, 
if a unit commander somehow manages to have his officers and 
senior petty officers participate in sensitivity training and 
they do adopt this brand of leadership, what happens when they 
are transferred? Chances are they will revert back to the 
traditional style of management. For those individuals who 
cannot make the transition back, their career is over. 
There are certainly other factors to be considered before 
the Navy begins using sensitivity training on a large scale . 
However, before any decisions can be made, better long term 
ef f ectiveness figures must be developed in the civilia n 
community. We must be fairly certain where sensi t ivity train-
ing will take us. It is one thing to experime nt with small 
civilian organizations, and it is quite another thing to experi-
ment with an organization the size of the Navy, especially when 
national security is at stake. 
"By what diversity of means, in the differing types of 
human beings may the facilities be stimulated to their best 
results?" 
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INTRODUCTION 
Captain William Austin, USAF, began to scream in 
pain as the iron bar of the "stocks" started to scrape 
the flesh from his already swollen and infected ankles. 
Searing flashes of white and red shot through his 
tormented mind as he wished for only one thing--death! 
The prison's Camp Commander swore as he jumped up 
and down on the iron bar. The bar would not close 
tightly enough to allow the locking pin to be slipped 
into place. The skin on the sides of Captain 
Austin's ankles split like ripe tomatoes as white 
particles of fatty tissue spread into the tight spaces 
between the iron bar and the wooden base of the stocks. 
There was no blood because the stocks acted like a 
tourniquet. 
When the locking pin was in place, the Camp Commander 
admonished his victim for screaming by saying, "You have 
broken the camp regulations by screaming. If you break 
the regulations again, you will lose you right to the 
lenient and humane treatment given to American Air 
Pirates by the peace-loving peoples of Vietnam." 
Ue.u;te.na.nt Commande.lt. J.M. Mc.GIULth, U.S. Navy, ILec.uved h.i..6 B.S. deglLee ht 
19 6 3 6Mm .the U.S. Na.val Ac.a.d~y a.nd lu.6 M. S. ht Ma.nag ~e.nt ht 1915 6Mm 
.the. Na.val Poll:tgJta.dua.te Sc.hool. · 
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Primitive man and his barbarian descendants killed or 
enslaved all prisoners that fell into their hands. From the 
earliest times, the whims of the victor have decided the 
fate of those who lost the battle and were captured. Romans 
used their war cap t ives for target practice or gladiatorial 
shows. Captured warriors rowed Caesar's naval galleys to 
North Africa and Britain, and were mercilessly killed when 
they could no longer pull an oar. (18:3] Even the Chr i stians 
disemboweled their Moslem enemies during the Christian Cru-
sades as they fought to recover the Holy Land. 
Barbaric treatment of a captured enemy continued through-
out history with no rules for the treatment of captives even 
formulated, let alone followed. In the 18th Century, a step 
forward was made when Europeans considered captivity as a 
means of preventing return to friendly forces. Military 
captives were no longer considered guilty of crimes again s t 
the state. These European concepts on the treatme nt of 
prisoners eventually led to the Hague Regulations of 1907, 
which in turn led to the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949. 
(18:5] 
Oriental attitudes toward the treatment of prisoners 
were not nearly so chivalrous . The Geneva Conventions of 
the Western World held little sway over the Oriental Wor ld. 
Japanese culture, for instance, held that there was no 
alternative to defeat except death. True soldiers and mili-
tary men were expected to commit suicide rather than surren-
der. Military prisoners were held in such contempt that 
their treatment usually consisted of physical torture, de-
gradation, forced servility and possible execution. (2:6] 
Th is paper will present a comparison of two Oriental 
countries' treatment of the American prisoners of war that 
each held. The treatment afforded American POWs in North 
Korea and North Vietnam is a vivid example of man's in-
humanity to man. 
AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN KOREA 
The Korean War started precisely at 4 o'clock in the 
morning of June 25, 1950 . The People's Republic of Korea 
(North Korea) troops swiftly crossed the 38th parallel en-
route to the capital city of Seoul. [18:7] Six days after 
the invasion, the U.S . 24th Infantry Di v i sion was rushed to 
Korea from Japan. U.S. Army troops were put into action 







Soon after American prisoners had been taken, the Army of 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent the following 
message to the Secretary General of the UN: 
THE ARMY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
KOREA IS STRICTLY ABIDING BY THE PRINCIPLES OF 
THE GENEVA CONVENTION IN RESPECT TO PRISONERS OF 
WAR. 
PAK HEN YEN 
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
PYONGYANG [21: 7] 
This was merely a propaganda ruse. North Korea had no in-
tentions of carrying out any part of the Geneva Conventions 
relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War. 
Communist handling and treatment of POWs can be divided 
into two distinct periods. From June 1950 to April 1951, 
Americans and other UN POWs were under the control of the North 
Koreans. In the spring of 1951, Chinese Communist Forces .as-
sumed control of all aspects of the war, including the POWs. 
These two periods are distinct from one another in regard to 
the treatment the United States prisoners received. The North 
Koreans were barbaric in their treatment of POWs. On the 
other hand, the Chinese Communists' treatment of POWs was re-
latively lenient. This "lenient policy," however, was employed 
only as a device to make the prisoners more receptive to 
Communist interrogation and political indoctrination. [20:17] 
The POWs were first forced to march north to the prison 
camps. They had barely enough food to survive. Brutality from 
the North Korean guards, along with the lack of food and lack 
of medical attention for the wounded, made the death rate soar. 
Biting cold and winter snows caused severe frostbite. Those 
who fell behind and those who slowed to help a fallen comrade-
in-arms were shot. 
One group of 320 POWs was marched north a distance of 300 
air miles. Out of this group, only 120 survived. From another 
groups of 650 who marched north to the Yalu River, 200 arrived 
at the final camp. Of these, nine lived through the winter to 
eventually return to America after the war. [21:52-53] 
The camps encountered by the POWs were all bad--some 
worse than others. Medical attention was almost nonexistent 
while the food could hardly be called food by American stand-
ards. Americans weren't used to a diet of rice, supplemented 
with an occasional bowl of foul tasting soup. The POWs lost 
strength and health as their weight quickly dropped. Diarrhea 
turned to dysentery. One sickness after another broke out in 
the camps. 
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The POWs suffered through the hot summers and the cold 
winters with temperatures dropping as low as 50 degrees below O 
zero. Men were forced to huddle together for warmth as they 
fought to stay alive through the freezing winters. The barracks 
were foul and unsanitary. Drinking water was often polluted. 
In some of the "better" camps, a few Red Cross packages 
were received, but the prisoners never saw a Red Cross repre-
sentative. A few men received candy, some tobacco, and 0 
occasional mail. These items didn 1 t come without their price--
measured by the amount of cooperation one gave the enemy. 
The camps acquired names from the men who marched north. 
The "bad" camps included the so-called "Bean Camp," where one 
survivor reported burying between 125 and 150 men in a six-week 
period. "Death Valley," near Pukchin, and the "Valley," near 
Kanggye were also very bad. The "Interrogation Center" and 
"The Caves" were among the worst camps. (18:9] Here, the POWs 
were forced to live a life of complete misery and degradation 
beyond belief. The POWs were often accused of, and punished 
for, such "crimes" as breaking the camp rules, insubordination 
or attempting escape. The charges were of course false. 
In a camp known as 11 Camp V, 11 the death rate soared. Men 
dropped by the hundreds from pneumonia, dysentery, beriberi 
and pellagra. Many .of the younger (and supposedly stronger) 
men, ages 17-19, died from the strangest of all things--giving 
up their will to live. This phenomenon became know as the 
"Sudden Death Syndrome." (17:153] Once a man reached this 
state of mind, he would sulk into a corner, pull a blanket over 
his head or curl up on his side in a fetal position--and die! 
Having become hopelessly demoralized and depressed, the men re-
signed themselves to a fate of death. In this state of mind, 
the men may well have died a parasympathetic rather than a 
sympathicoadrenal death. [15:241) Altogether, some 1500 men 
died in Camp V, with most of the deaths being directly trace-
able to malnutrition. 
Possibly the worst camp in North Korea was an interroga- 8 
tion center known as "Pak's Palace." The camp was run by a 
ruthless schizophrenic named Major Pak. Major Pak reportedly 
turned psychotic after he had seen a 2,000 pound bomb hit his 
house with his sister in it. [21:69] 
The Chinese Communists instituted extensive indoctrination 
programs. The POWs were considered as "students" who were to 
be "re-educated" along Communist lines. Their real objectives, 
however, were not to "teach" or "sell" Communism but rather to 
"unsell" democracy. Their hope was not to make Communists out 
of the prisoners, but to destroy the POW's faith and trust in 
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his government, country, and political leaders. [20:36] The 
principal techniques employed by the Communists to carry out 
their plan of indoctrination were: repetition, harassment, 
and humiliation. [20:43] 
Many propaganda programs of indoctrination were generally 
preceded by months of starvation diets, deaths and demoraliza-
tion. The denial of food was a part of orthodox Marxist 
O methods of indoctrination in Asia. As the Communists discovered 
which men would cooperate for rewards of extra food, the camps 
soon became divided between "Progressives"--those who cooper-
ated--and "Reactionaries"--those who continued to resist. The 
Progressives were then planted in the camps as spies and in-
formants. The informants contributed greatly to the demoraliza-
tion of the POWs. 
The Chinese Communists thus launched a well designed psycho-
logical program of operant conditioning designed to control 
their prisoners and to systematically break down all interper-
sonal relationships. This program of mental and physical tor-
ture could be likened to the "Pavlov Dogs" treatment. It was 
here that the term "brainwashing" was first used. [2:8] While 
this term, "brainwashing," was used very loosely to describe 
Communist indoctrination techniques, it is not entirely accurate. 
Actual "brainwashing" is a prolonged psychological process 
directed against an individual for the purpose of erasing an 
individual's past beliefs and concepts and substituting new 
ones. Research and studies conducted by several Government 
agencies failed to reveal even one conclusively documented case 
of actual "brainwashing" of an American prisoner of war in 
Korea • [ 2 0 : 4 5 ] 
By waging an ideological war employing various methods of 
interrogation in conjunction with a coercive indoctrination 
program, the Communists were able to create an environment 
characterized by fear, distrust, and confusion. As a result, 
some 70 per cent of the 4,428 Americans who survived Communist 
imprisonment had contributed to some degree, either wittingly 
or unwittingly, to the Communist's psychological warfare 
efforts in Korea. [19:7] 
The treatment of American POWs by the Communists clearly 
revealed that the Communist nations considered their captives 
as powerful instruments for furthering their psychological war-
fare goals. To the Communists, human lives were of little 
value when it came to obtaining propaganda with which to dis-
credit the United States and the United Nations in the Far East. 
Approximately 38 per cent of those taken prisoner by the 
Communists died in captivity. [18:25] 
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AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM 
In 1957, the newly formed government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) acceded to and pledged it-
self to adhere to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Less than 
ten years later this same government would be torturing 
American prisoners of war, in direct violation of those princi-
ples she swore to respect. 
On August 5, 1965, LT Everett Alvarez became the first 
American to be captured in North Vietnam. His A-4 "Sky Hawk" 
was downed over the port city of Haiphong as he attacked a 
group of torpedo boats. LT Alvarez spent the next 8-1/2 years 
as a POW in the French-built prisons of Hanoi, North Vietnam. 
LT Alvarez was one of 456 aircrewmen who survived the 
prisons of North Vietnam. Vietnamese officials reported that 
55 Americans died in captivity. Not one of these men, who 
supposedly died, died before American witnesses, nor have any 
of their remains been allowed to be exhumed to be returned to 
America. Many of the men who reportedly died were alive and 
last seen in good health by other American POWs. How many of 
these men are still alive and as yet not repatriated? How 
many died while being tortured by the North Vietnamese? 
Unlike Korea, with death marches to prison camps, the 
Vietnamese transported their newly captured pilots to the 
.. Hanoi Hilton" in Jeeps and trucks. During the trips, the POWs 




All newly captured pilots were taken to the French-built 
prison, "Hoa Lo, 11 better known to the POWs as the "Hanoi 
Hilton." When LT Alvarez arrived in Hoa Lo, the prison was 
being run by the Hanoi Police Department. His treatment wasn't 
too bad. The Viet n amese Army took over the prison in late 
1965. Treatment rapidly turned for the worse. Army interroga-
tors tried all the standard principles of indoctrination used 0 
in Korea. In fact, one Vietnamese interrogator boasted that o 
he knew all about Americans and how to extract information from 
them, having been trained in interrogation techniques by the 
North Koreans. After it became apparent to the Communists that 
they were getting nowhere using interrogation and indoctrina-
tion alone, they began to use torture. 
The interrogators began each session by asking the POWs 
their name, rank, serial number and date of birth. When 
further questioning did not get results, the infuriated 
interrogator would make threats of execution and "punishment. 11 





When quuti.0YUY1.g dld no.t ge.t the nutd.t.6 ••• 
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"Vietnamese rope trick. 11 A nylon riser s t rap was used to tight-
l y bind t he arms together behind the back. The arms were bound 
so t i gh t ly that the elbows we re touching. The body was bent 0 
forward u n til the feet cou ld be brought up behind the head with 
the help of an iron bar for leverage. This ca u sed extreme pain 
in the back and legs as all the stiff muscles and tendons 
seemed to be torn from the body. If the victim had not talked 
by this time, the arms were violently rotated toward the head. 
The shoulders then dislocated. 
PAI N--one of the mo st unpleasant and distress-
ing physiological sensations known to man . I t can be 
descri b ed and defined, but it can never be under-
stood until i t is experienced. One can't explain 
the horrible pain that results from hav i ng the 
shoulders slowly dislocated by the above-described 
"rope trick. 11 The body and soul try to scream in 
anguish , but i t's impossible to do whe n a rusty 
iron bar with rags around it has been j ammed through 
the teeth and into the t hroat. The victim wishes he 
could d i e, but he c an ' t . 







It was thus that the Communists broke down the pilots one 
by one. Results could be gained even more quickly when the 
pilots had broken bones or other injuries. Medical treatment 
was denied and the broken bones were often tortured directly. 
Few men, if any, were able to stick to name, rank and serial 
number. It is generally felt that those who did are not around 
today to tell about it. 
After the interrogators had extracted as much military 
information as they thought possible, they began to work on 
getting a complete biographical background on each man. Every-
one was forced or threatened into completing a biographical 
questionnaire covering the following general categories: 
1) General data, which covered the POW's whole past 
life, including every assignment of his military 
career. 
2) Military information concerning the POW's squad-
ron, ship or base, aircraft, and weapons systems. 
3) Political attitudes and convictions of the prisoner. 
These questionnaires had to be answered in detail and in 
a comprehensive manner if the prisoner was to avoid punish-
ment. This is one of several standard Communist techniques of 
interrogation used by the Soviet Union against German and 
Japanese POWs. The Chinese used this technique in Korea. [20:10] 
Most of the information gained was false. 
It is estimated that well over 95 per cent of the Vietnam 
POWs wrote out biographies of themselves. The Communists con-
sidered it to be an essential part of the degradation and 
humiliation process. In Korea, 91 per cent of the POWs wrote 
biographies. [19:7] 
After the initial interrogations were finished, the POWs 
were moved to Heartbreak Hotel" and "Little Vegas," cellblocks 
within the "Hanoi Hilton." Once placed in their permanent 
cells, the prisoners faced a grueling daily life. Beatings and 
harassment from the guards were common. Many men were placed 
in manacles, stocks, leg irons or handcuffs as punishment for 
"breaking the Camp Regulations." If the prisoner were lucky, 
he had a roommate to whom he could quietly wh~sper. Most men 
did not acquire a roommate until months of solitary confinement 
had passed. A few lived in solitary confinement for a period 
of years. Captain Howard Rutledge spent 58 months in solitary 
confinement, for example. [16] 
Most of the beatings and barbaric treatment came when the 
guards caught a prisoner breaking the unlivable camp regulations. 
Communicating ~ith a prisoner in an adjoining cell was one of 
the more serious offenses. If a POW was caught communicating, 
he might well be forced into making an · apology to the Camp 
Commander, forced to write a false "confession," as well as 
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having to live for a period of weeks in leg irons or stocks. 
The Communists also used violations of the regulations as a pre-
text to torture or otherwise force a POW to agree to meet a O 
"Jane Fonda" or other "Peace" de l egation. 
The arrival of hundreds of new prisoners necessitated the 
formation of new POW camps. As in Korea, all camps were bad, 
some being worse than others. The camps, as named by the POWs, 
included the 11Zoo, 11 "Annex," "Power Pla n t," "Skid Row," "Briar 
Patch," 11Dog Patch," .. Dirty Bird," • p1antation,n "Son Tay," and 0 
"Alcatraz." Possibly the worst camp was Briar Patch. Treatment 
was dependent on a ruthless Camp Commander named "Frenchy." The 
prisoners suffered from the brutality of the guards as well as 
the poor camp conditions. Almost every man suffered from beri-
beri because of a lack of vitamins and protein. 
C:if;t~ .m 
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Torture and harsh treatment of the POWs continued until 
October 1969 . At that time, all leg irons, manacles, hand-
cuffs, etc., were removed from those who wore them. The 
bricked-up windows were opened, allowing fresh air to flow 
freely into th _e foul smelling rooms. Beatings with rubber 
hoses ceased, with the exception of a few disciplinary cases. 
Political indoctrinations ceased almost completely. 
The reasons for the improvement in treatment may never be 
completely known, but a few possibilities are: 
1) Ho Chi Minh , the ruthless Communist leader of North 
Vietnam, had died the previous month causing a 
power shift within the government. The new leaders 
may not have been as barbaric as Ho Chi Minh. 
2) Countries throughout the world,. the United States in 
particular, had been demanding better treatment for 
the POWs. The resultant public outcry may have 
helped to cause the North Vietnamese to change their 
policies. 
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Whatever the reasons, the POWs had life much easier. They 
s p ent the next three years 0 existing .. and waiting for the war 
to come to an end. The Communists adopted a " l ive a nd let 
live" attitude, with harassment from the guards droppi ng almost 
to zer o . Food quality and quantity improved rapidly. The 
prisoners were allowed to exercise for the first time. As a 
result of improved co nditions, the prisoners steadily gained 










The Communists in Korea did not as a rule employ systema-
tic, physical torture in conjunction with interrogation or in-
doctrination. The North Vietnamese Communists, on the other 
hand, did use torture for these purposes. The reason may lie 
in the fact that the POWs in Vietnam were, for the most part, 
dedicated professional military officers . They had received 
training in the Code of Conduct and methods of countering 
Communist exploitation techniques. If the Communists were to 
gain any of their objectives, they had to resort to force. 
The Chinese approach to treatment of POWs emphasized con-
trol of groups, rather than control of the individual. The 
Vietnamese preferred to maintain control of the individual, 
keeping him weak, demoralized, and isolated from any contact 
with Americans. They were able to attempt this because of 
the relatively small number of POWs they held captive. 
53 
The North Vietnamese Communists tried to employ many of 
the same methods as the Chinese for the purpose of creating an 
environment of fear, distrust, and confusion. In general, 
they failed because they were unable to break down the bonds 
of faith and trust that the Americans had in each other and in 
America. 
In both Vietnam and Korea, the Communists sought to divide 
and conquer by denying the POWs their normal source of leader-
ship and by isolating them from every emotional and social 
support on which all prisoners so heavily rely. [20:241 The 
Communists in Vietnam failed to accomplish their objectives 
partly because of their own ineptness, but more so because of 
a tremendous effort on the part of all the POWs to communicate, 
even with those in remote corners of the camps, for the purpose 
of maintaining high morale. 
The Communists of North Korea had some success in destroy-
ing group cohesiveness and trust by undermining all feelings 
of spirit and fellowship through a designed system of informers. 
The Vietnamese were not able to establish any such system. 








Commwu.c.a.t..i.ng with a pJUAoneJt ht an adjoi.nlng c.e.U.. 
Food rations available to the POWs was one of the main 
differences between Korea and Vietnam. The Koreans literally 
starved prisoners to death. The Chinese used the denial of 
food as a weapon in their indoctrination programs : The North 
Vietnamese sometimes used the withholding of food as a weapon 
during interrogation periods, but they did not, as a rule, 
withhold food for indoctrination purposes. Prisoners normally 
had two small meals per day. These meals consisted of bread 
or rice along with a thin bowl of cabbage or pumpkin soup. The 
food that was provided was very low in protein, vitamins, and 
minerals, but it was enough to keep a man alive. Having regular 
meals and boiled drinking water was one of the main reasons 
that more Americans did not die in the Hanoi prisons. 
The difference in weather was also a major factor why 
Americans did not die in Vietnam. The POWs did not have to 
face the snows and freezing temperatures that the Korean POWs 
faced. Although many POWs in Vietnam suffered through cold 
winters with inadequate clothing, no known deaths occurred 
from cold or exposure. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the author has compared a few of the simi-
larities and differences in the treatment of POWs in the prison 
camps of North Vietnam and North Korea. The sim i larities dis-
cussed did not occur by accident . The U.S.S.R. used and deve-
loped these methods of indoctrination and interrogation long 
before the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The tactics and methods 
employed by the Soviets were passed on to other Communist 
governments who also sought to control and influence the 
actions of their p r isoners. Th i s control was directed toward 
the end result of ga i n i ng propaganda from the POWs, while at 
the same time hoping to undermine the POWs' loyalty to their 
country and their fa i th in the democratic way of life. 
We can be assured that the next time the United States 
faces a Communist enemy in a conflict such as Vietnam or Korea, 
the enemy's actions to achieve their desired ends and their 
treatment o f prisoners of war will b e much the same. Prisoners 
of war will once ag ain bear witness to man's inhumanity to man. 
M.ike Mc.Gttath ha.& geneJLoU6£.y p11.ovided the. illU.6 .t,urt,i. 011.6 whic.h 
a.c.c.ompa.ny tw pa.pell. They a.11.e jU6:t a 6ew 611.om the coUe.ction whJ..ch 








[1] American Enter rise Institute for Public Polic Research. 
'The Prisoner of War Prob em. Analysis No. 6, 
Dec. 1970, pp. 1-30. 
[ 2] Benediktsson, P. W., Cdr. USN, "The Singing Bird." An 
0 unpublished paper, NPS Monterey. 
[3] Bettelheim, Bruno. "Individual and Mass Behavior in Ex-
treme Situations." An article prepared from material 
more fully reported in Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 1943, pp. 417-452. 
[4] Chafee, John H. "P.O.W.'s Treatment: Principles Versus 
Propaganda." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 
1971, pp. 14-17. 
[5] Congressional Record, Vol. 115, No. 149. u. s. Govt. 
Printing Office, September 1969, pp. H8019-H8087. 
[61 Draper, Gerald & Irving A. Dare. "The Red Cross Conven-
tions." New York, 1958, pp. 49-72. 
[71 Frisbee, John L. "Surviving in Hanoi's Prisons." Air 
Force Magazine, June 1973, pp. 28-33. 
[8] Gaither, Ralph, LCDR, USN. With God in a P.O.W. Camp. 
Nashville, 1973. 
[9] Greenspan, Morris. Soldier's Guide to the Laws of War. 
Washington, 1969. 
[10] Havens, Charles W. "North Vietnam Violates Its Own 
Heritage--Mistreatment of POWs." Armed Forces Journal 
International, July 1971, pp. 32-33. 
[11] Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security 
Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-
Second Congress, First Session. U.S. Govt. Printing 
Office. March 1971, pp. 216-521. 
[12] Heinl, Robert D. "POWs: Study in Contrasts." Armed 
Forces Journal International, Vol. 110, No. 16, 
April 1973, p. 16 . 
57 
(13] McGrath, John Michael . Through Hell in Hanoi. Unpub-
lished manuscript , Monterey, 1973. 
[14] The New York Times , April 1, 1973, p. 62; April 4, 1973, 
p. 11; . April 6 , 1973, p. 4; April 7, 1973, p. 9; 
March 30, 1973, p. 1; March 31, 1973, p. 4. 
(15) Richter, Curt P. "On the Phenomenon of Sudden Death in 
Animals and Man." Psychosomatic Medicine, June 1957, 
pp. 234-242. 
(16] Rutledg~ Howard and Phyllis. I n the Presence of Mine 
Enemies. New Jersey, 1973. 
[17] Schein, Edgar H. "The Chinese Indoctrination Program for 
Prisoners of War: A Study of Attempted Brainwashing . " 
Psychiatry, Vol. 29, 1965, p . 153. 
[18] The Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners 
of War. "POW--The Fight Continues After the Battle." 
Washington, D. C., 1955. 
[19) Segal, Julius. "Factors Related to the Collaboration and 
Resistance Behavior of U. s. Army PW's in Korea." 
HUMMRO, Technical Report 33, December 1956. 
[20] U.S. Department of the Army. "Communist Interrogation, 
Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War." 
Pam 30-101, Washington, 1956, pp. 1-71. 








IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A BACKGROUND PAPER 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unionization of the military is currently viewed with a 
great deal of apprehension and worry by our governmental leaders 
and military establishment. Nevertheless, the possibility 
exists that a labor union (of sorts) within the military could 
become a reality in the near future. Clyde Weber., President 
Comma.ndeJt. G. L. Vev.i.n.6, LJ. S. Navy, ILec.e.i.ved hi1, B. S. deg1r.e.e. ..i.n Eng..i.ne.e/t..i.ng 
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Sc.hoot. 
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Ue.u;te.na.n:t Cormia.nde.Jt G. A. Mon-te,i;th, Supply ColLp.6, U.S. Navy, Jr.ec.e.i.ve.d hi1, 
B.S. deg11.ee. ,i.n Ma1r.ke.:ti.ng o/tom the. Un.i.ve.lr..6-i.:ty oo Tul.6a ,i.n 1963 a.nd ,lli 
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of the American Federation of Governmental Employees, AFGE, has 
stated that, "service people need somebody to represent them, 
that's for sure." 1 Also he has indicated that his union is 0 
considering organizing military personnel. Richard B. Beaumont, 
a former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, has recently told the 
Defense Manpower Commission that the military can expect to be 
unionized by 1980. Mr. Beaumont said, "the military is fantas-
tically naive about what individuals will suffer ... The fact 
that the military has not organized is one of the great perplex- O 
i ng phenomena as far as I am concerned. One of the major tasks 
t ha t the U.S. faces is to prepare military leaderships for the 
fact that they may (organize) ... 111 
The events or situation that could cause our military per-
sonnel to turn to a union should carefully be weighed by our 
civilian and military leaders. What could unionization offer 
military personnel today that its current leaders haven't 
provided? What limitations should be imposed on potential 
military unions? The very thought of military unions in the 
United States still causes blood to boil in some people; how-
ever, from recent news media accounts this attitude has tapered 
off and some national leaders are predicting that we will have 
at least attempts of military union organizing within the next 
few years. 
The purpose of this paper i s to review the development of 
private and public unions in th e United States coupled with the 
development of foreign military unions. Some items for con-
sideration by military managers are presented. 
II. UNIONIZATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The importance of an abstract accounting of the history 
of labor/trade unions in the private sector in the United 
States is considered to be relevant to this discussion. This 
writing generally encompasses the beginning struggles of the 
unions, the general development of the unions, important legis -
l ation governing the unions with final emphasis upon union 
activity in more recent years and concluding statements . The 
discussion is relevant as it not only provides the basis for 
understanding the eventual development of unions in the public 
sector but it also provides us with some understanding of the 
reasons why unions were formed and have developed. Examining 
the past will hopefully yield a better understanding of preced-
ing events and a possible insight into things to come. 
A. Introduction 
It wasn't until the end of the nineteenth century 




collectively rather than individually when dealing with their 
employers. There were two distinct groups in the labor force 
at that time: the skilled, usually craft workers; and the un-
skilled common laborers. 
There was a great deal of opportunity for individual 
advancement and because of the freedom to move from place to 
place, it was relatively easy for a person to pass from one 
class to another thereby changing his social and economic 
status. For this reason alone, it was difficult for organized 
labor to take substantial and permanent root with the American 
people. There were other major reasons that hindered the · 
development of unions, including the long predominance of an 
agricultural economy, the strong individualism inherent in the 
American public and the lack of urban growth and industrializa-
tion in our formative years. Other factors included slavery, 
where it existed, immigration supplying a cheap labor force, and 
the conservationism of the courts which conditioned what labor 
legislation was enacted. 
Organized labor that did develop was weak and local 
in nature for many years and protective labor legislation was 
very slow to develop. Despite these problems, laborer's status 
did progress as the country grew. There were gradual gains 
made in pay and working conditions, but it was progress made 
only against bitter opposition. 
Even though the relationship between employer and em-
ployee was usually friendly and cordial because individual 
plants did not require many workers, the psychological rela-
tionship was still one of master and servant which was a de-
finite obstacle to organization. 
Given these obstacles and the prevailing · attitudes, 
labor as an organized economic and political force did not be-
come important until mass production came to be significant 
characteristic of American industrial economy and the new de-
mands for large output came to require the gathering of many 
employees under one roof. 
B. Early Unions 
Philadelphia was the home of many early attempts to 
form unions and the honor of the first union goes to the 
Philadelphia shoemakers who founded the Federal Society of 
Cordwainers in 1792. It lasted less than a year but reorgan-
ized in 1794 and continued until 1806. From then on a number 
of crafts attempted to organize. 
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The first recorded strike took place before there was 
actually a union formed when, in 1786, the printers of Philadel- 0 
phia quit their jobs in protest of a cut in their wages below 
$6.00 per week.2 
As unions organized, there were many strikes conducted 
with minimal results. The unions were dealt a severe blow 
when, in 1805, the Philadelphia Cordwainers went on strike for 
a new wage scale and plus other demands, and the leaders of the 0 
strike were arrested, tried and convicted for conspiracy to 
raise their wages . This set an important precedent for the 
criminal prosecution of labor union activities. Four years 
later the event was repeated with the same results and it wasn't 
until nearly 30 years later that a Massachusetts court, in the 
famous Commonwealth vs Hunt (1842) decision stated that a strike 
of workers to improve their conditions was deemed lawful and 
not a criminal conspiracy.3 
By 1829, numerous unions had emerged in various cities 
but t heir power and effectiveness were severely restricted be-
cause of the generally unfavorable attitude of the courts 
toward strike activity in efforts to improve wages. Further-
more, the union growth was closely paralleled by the formation 
of employers associations which sought non-u nion labor and fre-
quent l y resorted to courts in opposition to worker organization. 
During the period 1827-1837, the industrial revolu-
tion was getting a good start but immigration was increasing 
and employers were able to obtain all the cheap labor they 
wanted. In addition, large numbers of women and children were 
being employed under rather demanding conditions. Hours were 
long, wages were low and working conditions were generally 
poor. While conditions in labor were poor , the United States 
was prospering as a developing country. This was impetus 
enough for labor organizations to continue their struggle. In 
this period, labor was interested not only in higher wages, 
shorter working hours and better working conditions, but also 
political and social reform, such as public education. There 
0
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were a number of strikes in the later years of this period but 
the panic of 1837 with the resulting business failures brought 
a halt to unionization and to any at 2empts for reform in labor wages, hours and working conditions. 
From 1837 until the Civil War , there was a general 
lull in union activity although some gains were made, such as 
the aforementioned Commonwealth vs. Hunt decision. In addi-
tion, Federal civil service employees were granted the ten-hour 




During and after the Civil War, the transition of the 
American economy seeing small plants being replaced by large 
organizations fostered anew the interest in labor organization. 
The opportunity for individual advancement was no longer as 
widespread as the power of capital grew.3 
The largest and most influential union that emerged in 
the immediate postbellum years was the National Labor Union 
founded in 1866. It grew to over 600,000 members but it was 
more interested in social and political reform than strictly 
labor union problems. It associated itself with the Greenback 
party in 1872, lost a lot of its members as a result and slipped 
from the national scene. Another type of union developed about 
the same time that had a different outlook on the reason for 
their existence. These were the railroad brotherhood unions. 
They were, of course, concerned with obtaining higher wages and 
better working conditions, but they also stressed mutual insur-
ance and benefit programs. These unions have continued to 
dwell apart from other national unions. 
The 1870's saw a period of high unemployment and 
destitution. A secret and very militant organization called 
the Molly Maguires emerged about this time in the anthracite 
coal fields of Pennsylvania and their charter appeared to be 
to achieve all aims through violence and threats. Needless to 
say, they didn't last.2 
Another union was fostered about this time by a young 
cigarmaker named Samuel Gompers. His local union grew to 
national status and, after initial serious conflicts, it 
finally joined forces with the remnants of a reformist union 
called the Knights of Labor. The new union was called the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL). 
Gompers became one of the most famous early union 
leaders. He was influenced by his study of Karl Marx and his 
knowledge of English trade unionism. He favored centraliza-
tion of authority in the hands of union officers, payments of 
dues large enough to permit the accumulation of large strike 
funds, the adoption of a system of benefits to ensure union 
loyalty and the equalization of funds which, if necessary, 
would permit their transfer to small and weak unions. The 
improvements of working conditions, wages and hours was the 
thrust of the union rather than political and social reforms. 
Gompers' union developed a philosophy about wages called 
"business unionism" which had for its objectives the securing 
of benefits for workers enforced by a trade agreement. Where 
there was resistance to this, strikes, boycotts, and picketing 
were to be employed to achieve the benefits. As a counterbal-
ance to these tactics, the employers used the injunction, lock-
out and the blacklist. 4 
63 
In 1893, an event took place that was to produce a 
pattern of procedure that would endure for the next 20 years. 
Eugene V. Debbs, a noted socialist, led his union into the in-
famous Pullman Strike as a result of a cutback in wages. Then 
United States Attorney, Richard Olney, granted an injunction 
on the grounds that the strike was interfering with the United 
States mail. To enforce the injunction, the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act of 1890 was invoked for the first time against organiza-
tions of workers. Thus, a conspiracy charge could be involved 
against unions on strike and was used as a major weapon in in-
dustrial strike by employers.2 
Violent reaction to the growth of the unions in the 
early 1900's, along with the many strikes being encountered, 
brought many invocations of the injunction. This caused many 
labor leaders to renew their fight for the basic right to 
organize and strive for better conditions. The battle continued 
until 1914 when the use of the injunction was limited by the 
passage ot the Clayton Act which contained a clause which said 
that the labor of a human being was not a commodity or article 
of commerce. Consequently, the anti-trust laws could not be 
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor unions 
or their legitimate activities. 
Despite their growth pains, unions did make rapid gains 
in the early years of the twentieth century. On the other hand, 
strong employer associations were formed to counteract these 
gains. These organizations generally attacked the pri n ciples 
and practices of organized labor, basing their action primarily 
on the thesis that every individual should be guaranteed the 
right to work regardless of union affiliation. So the employ-
ers associations advocated the "open shop" as opposed to the 
union stance of "closed shop." The attitude of these associa-
tions gave rise to the t1yellow-dog contract 3 which was an agree-ment by a worker not to join a labor union. 
0 
0 
In the years preceding World War I, labor did gain 
some ground in the field of state labor legislation. Laws pro-
tecting women and children were passe d including maximum-hour Q 
legislation. Regulations regarding the safeguarding of the 0 
health of workers were approved and workman's compensation 
laws were also adopted widely. Their biggest gain was still 
embodied in the Clayton Act which, on the whole and by and 
large, put the unions beyond the control of anit-trust legis-
lation. 
The durat i on of the war was one of relative industrial 
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During the postwar period, the 1920's can be character-
ized as a period of decline for the unions. The general desire 
of government, industry and the public alike to return to 
normalcy was an important factor in the decline. During this 
period, there was an enormous increase in so-called company 
unions, established by the employer to prevent what it regarded 
as the evils of outside organization and at the same time de-
signed to promote greater efficiency and higher morale. It 
was not until the National Labor Relations Act outlawed the 
company union in Roosevelt's New Deal period that these organi-
zation~ ceased to function as a serious threat to organized 
labor. 
c. The Depression Impact 
During the 1920's, the impact of the industrial revolu-
tion furthered the practice of mass production in greater areas 
of manufacturing. This greatly increased the number of workers 
in industry and the general attitude of business for maximum 
production with little thought for the worker, gave rise to 
more and more discontent. These factors weighed heavily in 
changing the course of the labor movement after the stock 
market crash and following depression of the 1930's. 
The administration, Congress and the country as a whole 
were unprepared for the effects of the depression and the 
national government was unable to quickly produce any construc-
tive plan of action. 
The depression served to bring about a marked reversal 
in the traditional attitude maintained by Labor toward the 
government. Previously labor had always feared government-
sponsored labor programs on the theory that labor would be 
subjected to rigid controls and deprived of its freedom to 
fight for improved working conditions. Early in 1932, however, 
the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act gave to labor full free-
dom of association without interference by employers; yellow-
dog contracts were outlawed; and Federal Courts were prohibited 
from issuing injunctions in labor disputes except under care-
fully defined conditions. This act served to buoy labor's 
spirits and as the depression continued, they turned to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in hope that under his leadership even 
more action would be taken.3 
Under Roosevelt and his New Deal legislation, many 
make-work projects were begun as temporary measures. In 1935, 
passage of the National Labor Relations Act, popularly known 
as the Wagner Act, provided real strength to the powers of 
the unions. Five major practices considered unfair were pro-
hibited on the part of employees but there were no prohibi-
tions of practices by labor. In continuance of its program for 
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the improvement of workers status, the Roosevelt administration 
passed the Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act in 1936, estab-
lishing the forty-hour work week and the minimum wages for all 
employees making supplies for the government. Soon on its 
heels came the Fair Labor Standards Act which provided for 
maximum hours, minimum wages and the abolition of child labor. 
Then came the Social Security Act and as each of these was 
validated by Supreme Court decisions, they constituted an im-
posing program of social legislation, all of it highly favor-
able to labor. 2 
D. The Labor Split 
During the 1936 to 1938 period, the conflict between 
craft and industrial unionism resulted in the Conunittee for 
Industrial Organization organizing within the AFL as a splinter 
group. Efforts to reconcile their differences failed and in 
1938 the Committee became the Congess of Industrial Organiza-
tions (CIO) under John L. Lewis.4 
E. The Impact of World War II 
As the New Deal prosperity began to wane, war pre-
paredness and its demand for labor and materials of a wide 
variety and use brought about a decline in unemployment. Labor 
was hard at work in full support of the war effort, with the 
exception of the coal miners. Led by John L. Lewis, they went 
on strike in 1941 despite personal pleas by the President. 
Lewis forced the administratio n 's hand and was successful in 
establishing a union shop in the so-called "captive" coal 
mines. Lewis gained his contract on the very day the Japanese 
attacked Pearl Harbor.4 
0 
0 
In January 1942, the National War Labor Board was 
formed to handle all labor disputes during the course of the 
war. Labor disputes were normal again for John L. Lewis and 
his demand this time for increased wages for his miners. He 
l ed his men on strike and not until a new agreement was signed 
did he lead his men back to work. A national emergency was no 8 
excuse, he said, for exploiting the miners. During this period 
other disputes did arise, usually quickly settled by substan-
tial wage increases, often disguised as compensation for travel 
time, vacation pay and si,ilar awards which came to be known 
later as fringe benefits. 
The immediate postwar years saw a number of serious 
strikes throughout industry, most of which labor won in its de-
mands for increased wages, but it did so in the fact of in-
creasing public resentment against the inconveniences caused 







The public resentment was evident in the growing demand 
for curbs on labor's power, particularly its right to strike. 
As a consequence, in 1947 Congress passed the Labor-Management 
Relations Act, popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, which 
in effect left the core of the Wagner Act unchanged but provided 
for protection and greater freedom of action to management while 
restricting some union activities, including the power to call 
nationwide strikes that threatened the public health and inter-
est. The act also outlawed jurisdictional strikes and desig-
nated unfair labor practices of both management and unions. 
The closed shop was prohibited, but a union shop was permitted. 
The unions opposed it naturally enough, calling it a "slave-
labor" law and they took particular objection to a clause in 
the act that required certain officers in labor unions to take 
an oath to the effect that they were not members of the Co:mmgn-
ist Party. Numerous attempts to repeal the act have failed. 
The years following World War II saw such issues as 
vacations with pay, pensions, life insurance and health bene-
fits play a more prominent role in collective bargaining 
negotiations. In the early 1950's emerged the concept of 
industry-wide bargaining and the union fight for guaranteed 
annual wage which was finally negotiated into contract by the 
United Automobile Workers with the Ford and General Motors in 
1955. 
The year 1955 also saw labor leaders George Meany 
(AFL) and Walter Reuther (CIO} join hands to seal the merger 
of the two previous conflicting groups to give us the AFL-CIO 
as we see it today.3 
In 1959, the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act, also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, took a radical de-
parture from the federal labor legislation adopted ·since 1932. 
Whereas the earlier statutes were designed primarily to secure 
union objectives, this legislation was meant to protect employ-
ees, whether union members or not, from the policies and acts 
of unions. This shift in emphasis was mainly the result of 
investigations and disclosures made by the Senator McClellan 
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management 
Field, and by the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Committee. As a 
result of disclosures of these two committees, the AFL-CIO 
expelled three unions - among them the Teamsters, which became 
the nucleus of a new labor group under the strong leadership 
of James Hoffa.3 
F. More Recent Developments 
From the early 1960's to 1971, the labor scene was one 
little radical change, involving some major strikes and a lot 
of contract negotiations, but the issues remained primarily the 
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same. In 1971, the dominant theme in labor was government 
intervention. This began with the wage-price freeze instituted O 
by President Nixon on August 15 with the aim of stopping the 
persistent escalation of wages and prices. The freeze announce-
ment promptly threw labor relations into turmoil. All wages 
and salaries and most prices were frozen for 90 days. Although 
union leaders were distressed by the freeze, business leaders 
and most Republicans were enthusiastically favorable. Presi-
dent Nixon then announced Phase 2 in October which established 0 
a Pay Board consisting of 5 members each from business, labor 
and the public, whose job it was to restrict wage increases 
to 5.5% and product price increases to 2.5% on most items.6 
The year 1972 was the first since the 1930 1 s that any 
major segment of organized labor failed to endorse the Demo-
cratic nominee for President when George Meany, President of 
the AFL-CIO, refused to endorse Senator George McGovern. This 
was also the year in which the Pay Board saw some of its first 
major challenges. The International Longshoremen's and Ware-
housemen's Union (ILWU) and Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) 
had finally come to terms which exceeded the guidelines under 
which the Pay Board acted and the contract was denied . The 
result of this action almost touched off another nationwide 
strike and a side affect saw four of the five labor members of 
the Pay Board resign - only Teamsters' President Frank Fitz-
simmons remained.7 
It was an unusually peaceful year for labor in 1973. 
Hampered by a continuing wage freeze, union leaders negotiated 
quick settlements in almost all cases; however, in the face of 
the rising Consumer Price Index which had risen to 8.7% prior 
to June, George Meany, in his Labor Day speech said, "It is 
only a question of time before the pressure for wages is going 
to be much stronger than it is now in order to compensate for 
the increase in the cost of living~ particularly food prices. 
I would say this is a real worry." 
By far, the most unusual settlement of the year was O 
one between the United Steelworkers of America and ten of the o 
largest steel companies. The new contract prohibits national 
strikes, work stoppages, and company lockouts beginning in 
August 1974. Strikes over local issues will be allowed. The 
union's willingness to forego its right to a national strike 
was based on two factors. In the past when a strike loomed, 
steel manufacturers either stockpiled steel or increased their 
imports to offset expected shortages and ofte n , after steel-
workers returned to their jobs after a strike, there was no 
work for them until the stockpiles were used up.9 
An important development in the American Labor Move-





public employees, who constitute the largest of several groups 
of so-called new union constituencies. As the composition of 
the U.S. work force has changed, the profile of trade-union 
membership has been changing with it. Paralleling the emerg-
ence of white-collar unionism as the central feature of the 
labor movement of the United States is the increasing restive-
ness of women, black and other minority workers, who seem 
themselves underrepresented in the higher councils of organized 
labor. The appearance of the Coalition of Black Trade Union-
ists, Coalition of Labor Union Women and similar units repre-
senting Chicano, professional, and young workers points clear-
ly to an emergent worker's movement that will change the nature 
of trade unionism in the United States permanently. 
G. Summary 
The preceding discussion has traced the development of 
the unions since their early emergence in the late 1700's to 
the present. A few comments are now appropriate to some of the 
reasons behind their development. 
Appearances to the contrary, the past hasn't been one 
single, solidified labor movement. The methods and organiza-
tion of action programs designed to advance the interests of 
workers have never been unified or uniform in their patterns. 
Some of them have emphasized political means of obtaining de-
sired objectives. Others have sought to convert the public to 
new and different economic philosophies. Still others have, at 
one time or another, taken matters into their own hands and en-
gaged in mob activity. Some have allied themselves with 
particular sects and religious groups. Almost the only obvious 
element of similarity in labor movements is their apparent 
desire to improve the status of wage earners. 
Probably the most widely described theory of labor 
movement development is that popularized by John R. Commons 
which relates the rise and fall of these phenomena to fluctua-
tions in employment. According to this theory, labor movements 
emerge in periods of widespread unemployment. When most or all 
labor markets are glutted with labor supplies far in excess of 
demands, potential employees become dissatisfied, and they 
eagerly listen to suggestions for change. Their idleness and 
the destruction of habitual patterns of behavior increase 
their susceptibility to suggestion. When cylical changes re-
verse the pattern, so that labor markets are characterized by 
excesses of demands over available supplies, employees rapidly 
lose interest in proposed reforms. Moreover, their attention 
is restricted by their work, so that they tend to be less 
readily mobilized for precipitate action.10 
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In conclusion, it can be said that the labor union 
development has held a variety of objectives and has taken many 
forms. There is no single shape, pattern or model into which 0 
they all fall. All, however, have in common their general 
objective of advancing the social and economic s t atus of employ-
ees, and they all represent a type of social and economic 
cooperation that is distinctive and highly significant in the 
progress of our modern society. As they have reached their 
goals, in each sector of their influence, they have looked to 
new horizons in which to expand. It appears that they will do 0 
just that. 
III. UNI ONI ZATION IN THE PUBLI C SECTOR 
A. Introduction 
The organized labor movement within the public sector 
of the United States can be tracked back to the same early be-
ginnings as in the private sector. The initial starting date, 
of course, depends on the definition of "organized." Using a 
broad sense, it can be established that the first federal em-
ployees to become involved in unionization were skilled an d 
semi-skil l ed workers in Navy Yards, Army Arsenals and similar 
establishments. As early as the 1830's they s t arted to join 11 labor organizations that were being formed in th e ir localities. 
As a further example the earliest postal union dates back to 
1863 when the letter carriers in New York City organized.12 
Many other groups were likewise formed in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. Most were of a craft/trade brotherhood 
nature concerned, at the time, with craft maintenance and fel-
lowship. However, very few examples exist of the more modern 
connotation of unionism, i.e., "collective bargaining" in the 
public sector duri ng this development stage. 
B. Early Development 
The apparent lack of early public employee organiza-
tion activity has been explained by the suppositions that pub-
lic employees were so well taken care of by the governmental 
parent they served that they did not need to band together to 
achieve better working conditions and collective bargaining 
was not shown to be as necessary in public employment as it 
was in private industrial life.l2 
The honeymoon slowly ended with the new cent ury when 
the relative attractiveness of public employment deteriorated. 
Public employees became much more vocal, especially those re-
presented by the two large Postal Employee unions. Their tact i c 








processes and working conditions led the Postmaster General 
and later President Theodore Roosevelt to issue a "gag order. ••13 
The order issued by Roosevelt and expanded by President Taft in 
1909, to include all federal employees, read in part: 
All officers and employees of the United States, of 
every description, ..• are hereby forbidden, either 
directly or indirectly, individually or through 
associations, to solicit an increase in their pay 
or influence or attempt to influence in their own 
interest any other legislation whatever, either be-
fore Congress or its Committees, or in any way save 
through the departments •.. in or under which they 
serve, on penalty of dismissal from Government 
service. 
Nor may any such person respond to any request for 
information from either the house of Congress, or 
any Committee from either house of Congress, or any 
Member of Congress, except throµgh or as authorized 
by the Head of his Departrnent~4 
The gag orders, directed primarily toward the postal work-
ers (they accounted for a high percentage of all federal employ-
ees) remained in effect until 1912 when the policy was reversed 
by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act which is considered the Magna Carta 
of federal employee unionization. It read in part: 
..•. that membership in any society, association, 
club, or other form of organization of postal em-
ployees ... having for its object, among other 
things, improvements in conditions of labor of 
its members, including hours of labor and com-
pensation therefor .•. shall not constitute or 
be cause for reduction in rank or compensation 
or removal of such person or groups of persons 
from said service. The right of persons employed 
in the civil service of the United States, either 
individually or collectively, to petition Congress, 
or any member thereof, or to furnish information 
to either house of Congress, or to any Committee 
or member thereof, shall not be denied or inter-
fered with. 14 
Note that the provisions of the Act which guarantee the 
right of government employees to petition Congress applies to 
federal employees in general. On the other hand the proviso 
which prohibits the removal or demotion of employees for 
union membership applies only to postal employees. This dis-
tinction is attributable to the fact that in 1912 there were 
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no major federal employee's unions othe r than t h e postal unions. 
The National Federation of Fe deral Empl oyees was not founded 
until 1917. 
The next set of events effecting t he union of federal 
employees occurred with the passing of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), the Fair Labor Standards of 
1938 (Wage-Hour Law), the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, the 
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) and 
Public Law 330 (69 Stat 624) in 1955. 
The effects ranged from benign neglect (all Acts ex-
pressly excluded government employees of all categories from 
coverage) to, in the case of P.L. 330, making it a felony to 
"participate in any strike or assert the right to strike 
against the government. 11 14 
This state of unionism continued with little modifica-
tion and modest growth in numbers until 1961 when President 
Kennedy appointed a Task Force to investigate the role of em-
ployee·organizations in the governmental structure and to re-
commend policy on this role. He noted that the government had 
advocated organization of employees in private employment, but 
that a similar policy had not been established in the public 
sector. The studies of the Task Force indicated that of all 
federal employees, 33 percent or 762,000 workers belong to em-
ployee organizations . Although this figure matched that of the 
national proportion of organized employees engaged in non-
agricultural enterprises, over one-half of the government em-
ployees were employed by the Post Office Department which was 
84 percent organize d . The studies showed that 35 out of 57 
departments and agencies tended not to have guidelines or 
policies. However , l l departments hav i ng a policy provided 
only the minimum requirement which stated that an employee has 
the right to join or not to join a labor organization. The 
Task Force conclu ded its work by stating that: 
1. Although labor o rganizations had received 
limited recognition, they had little in-
flue n ce on the formulation and implementa-
tion of employee relation s policy. 
2. Employee organizations could contribute 
substantially to the ef f ec t iveness of 
operating the government. 
3. An execut i ve order shoul d be issued em-
bodyin g principles which would effect 
greater participation for employees in 
the determinatio n of the terms and condi-






C. Modern Development 
The recommendation of the Task Force was taken and 
President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10988 "Employee-
Management Cooperation in the Federal Service" on January 17, 
1962. The significance of the order lies in the fact that it 
represents the first government wide official employer policy 
on collective employee representation under which a wide 
variety of arrangements for cooperations and consultation 
prevail under a mandatory regulation. It spells out a clear 
cut policy on the right of employees to organize, to have 
their organizations accorded official recognition, to be con-
sulted in the establishment of personnel policies and proced-
ures, and under specified conditions, to negotiate agreements 
with agency management on working conditions. 
By September 1967, Executive Order 10988 had been in 
effect a sufficient length of time to warrant the establishment 
of a special Review Committee on Federal Employee Management 
Relations. The charge to the Committee by President Johnson 
was to review •.• "what the program has accomplished and where 
it is deficient and for consideration of any adjustments needed 
now to ensure its continued vitality in the public interest. 11 16 
The Review Committee found that a flourishing program 
existed where before Executive Order 10988 there was only a 
modicum and in many cases even a complete absence of ~ployee-
management cooperation in the formulation and implementation 
of the policies that shape the conditions of work for federal 
employees. 
The findings and recommendations of the Committee were 
incorporated in Executive Order 11491 "Labor-Management Rela-
tions in the Federal Service" issued on October 29, 1969, which 
substantially revised and strengthened E.O. 10988. 
The major elements of the federal policy embodied in 
the latest order is then: 
1. Declaration of employee participation in personnel 
policy development as a positive good. 
2. Affirmation of employee rights to join or not 
join labor organizations. 
3. A federal Labor Relations Council to administer 
the policy, decide major policy issues and handle 
appeals on such matters as units of representa-
tion, union eligibility, and negotiability of 
subjects. 
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4. A Federal Service Impasses Panel to settle im-
passes on s ubstantive issues in negotiations. 
5. Consultative arrangements applicable only to 
unions that have exclusive repr e sentatives of 
the majority of employees in a given unit. 
6. Provisions for written agreements. 
7. Elimination of agency mission, budget, organiza-
tion, number of employees, technology of work, 
and internal security from negotiability. 
8. Prohibition of strikes, work stoppages, slow 
downs or picketing. 
9. Prescription of standards of conduct for labor 
organizations and fair labor practices for agen-
cies. 
10. Engagement of an Assistant Secretary of Labor to 
determine union eligibility, elections and 
appropriate units for representation and the 
Civil Service Commission to guide and assist 
agencies through tech n ical advice, training and 
inspection of operations.17 
Executive Order 11491 has been revised twice since its 
issue in 1969. First Executive Order 11616 of August 26, 1971, 
amended 11491, without superseding it, in certain key areas 
which strengthen the opportunity for effective collec t ive 
bargaining in the federal service, enhanced the status of the 
exclusive representative, strengthen the union's role in the 
processing of grievances and several other minor changes. 
0 
0 
Then, most recently, Executive Order 11838 of February 
27, 1975, amended 11491, again without superseding and provided 
for revisions to several definitions and other changes both 
too new and too complex to be detailed in this presentation. () 
The majority of the preceding history has been feder-
ally oriented. The history of public unionism at a less-than-
federal level has been and continues to be widely divergent 
and fragmented. The stages of advancement at the state and 
local level run the gauntlet from very advanced, even beyond 
federal standards, to a complete political spoils system with-
out a civil service much less an organized system. 
In general, events in the federal sector have trailed 
behind the private sector with state and local following the 






The formation of unionization in the public sector has 
in general paralleled that of the private. This is to be ex-
pected since those workers who join the public sector bring 
their private sector values with them. However, the history 
of true collective bargaining in the public sector covers a 
very short period, dating essentially from 1962. What the 
future holds is anyone's conjecture, but the chances for any-
thing less than more unionism, more organization and more 
collective bargaining seems remote. 
The cause or causes of this apparently inevitable 
future can be stated, no more succinctly than by quoting Mr. 
William Doherty, the President of the National Association of 
Letter Carriers in 1960 in Mailman: 
Nothing historically has aided the growth of 
trade unionism both in and out of the govern-
ment more than has the consistent imbecility 
of management in dealing with rank-and-file 
employees. 
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IV. FOREIGN MILITARY UNIONIZATION 
AUSTRIA 
Current Force Structure 
The missions of the Austrian Armed Services are to secure 
0 
the Au strian frontiers, to protect the constitutional institu- Q 
tions, and to assist in natura l disasters. The armed forces 
of Austria total 33,750 members, with an Army of 30,000 and an 
Air Force of 3,750 as an integral part of the Army command. 
In addition, there is a further reserve force of 10,000 and an 
internal security force of 5,000. Austria does not have a 
Navy. 18 
The supreme command is vested in the Fede r al President, 
while operational control is exercised by the Minister of 
Defense. Advising the government on defense policy is a four-
teen member National Security Council which includes members 
of the Parliament, a high Defense Ministry official, key 
ministers, and the senior officer of the Armed Forces. 
As of 197~ all Austrian males are r equired to complete 
six months of military service. Career personnel may enlist 
for three, six or nine years of service. They may volu ntarily 
retire at age sixty, while mandatory retirement is at age sixty-
five. 
Military Unionization in Austria 
Approximately two-thirds of all Austrian wage and salary 
earners are organized in sixteen industrial unions. The 
Austrian Trade Union Federation (ATUF) handles overall trade 
union policy a nd legislative matters. 
All military members are considered government employees, 
and as such are represented by one of the industrial unions. 
Not until 1967 did the military take an active part in the J 
union, since the older senior officers did not condone member-
ship. In 1968,a branch of the Government Employee Union was 
established for the military. Since this time,military member-
ship in the Government Employees Union has increased and is 
estimated to be sixty-six percent of all officers and seventy-
five percent of all non-commissioned officers.19 
In general, members of the military do not consider they 
have the right to strike, although members of the Government 
Employees Unio n have the right to strike since Austria has no 





Austrian law does prohibit union involvement during periods 
of national emergency and when national interests are jeopard-
ized. Otherwise, union activities are limited to economic and 
welfare matters. Strict military matters such as training, 
security, assignment, justice, etc., are not a subject for 
union negotiation or intervention. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Military Union Membership 
The union has been successful in gaining increased bene-
fits in the form of higher pay and allowances and increased 
vacation. No serious disadvantages of union membership are 
apparent. There is no longer a stigma attached to union mem-
bership. 
DENMARK 
Current Force Structure 
The Danish defense forces have been organized with the 
primary mission of fighting a holding action until allied 
assistance can come to their support (Denmark has been a member 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1949). 
The Armed Forces of Denmark consist of a standing Army of 8,500 
with a mobilization unit and local defense force of 65,000. 
Naval personnel total 7,500 with a reserve of 4,500 in the 
Naval Home Guard (similar to the U.S. Coast Guard). Air Force
20 personnel total 9,700 with the Air Force Home Guard of 11,500. 
The supreme political authority is vested in the Minister 
of Defense. The Chief of Defense has full command of the 
three services. The Minister of Defense is assisted by a 
Defense Council consisting of the Chief of Defense, the Chief 
of Defense Staff, the Chief of Danish Operational Forces, and 
the Commanders-in-Chief of the services. 
o According to the Personnel Act of 1969, the military per-
0 sonnel comprise officers, non-commissioned officers and 
privates. Privates are provided by enlistment and by recruit-
ing of volunteers. Selection of conscripts takes place at the 
age of 18-1/2 years, and the conscripts are normally called 
up for nine months service one to one and a half years later. 
Afterwards, conscripts may be recalled for refresher training 
or muster. Mandatory age for retirement ranges from 35 to 65 
depending on length of contract for non-commissioned officers 
and rank for officers. 
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Military Unionization i n Denmark 
Danish workers are highly organized. Approximately 95% 0 
of all trade workers are members of a trade union affiliated 
with the Danish Federation of Trade Unions. White collar 
worke r s, farm workers and domestic workers are also affiliated 
with various unions, although not in as large a number. 
Since 1922, career military personnel have had the right O 
to join organizations which combined the fraternal and labor 
relations functions. These organizations have the r i ght to 
present to the Minister of Defense for consideration at the 
national level such matters as pay and allowances, promotions, 
working conditions, and benefits. All military personnel ex-
cept draftees are eligible for union membership. In fact, 
union membership is automatic unless the military member states 
that he chooses not to belong. 21 The military unions are 
separate from those in the private sector but are affiliated 
with the Academic Union. A separate union exists for Army 
and Navy apart from the Air Force officers. However, a joint 
union exists for non-commissioned officers and volunteers. 
Local societies exist at each military installation with month -
ly dues required from each member. 
Members of the military unions have no right to strike. 
Further, the union has no say in strictly military matters. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Military Union Membership 
The unions have been successful in negotiating special pay 
for overtime, additional uniform benefits and improved working 
condi t ions . Union membership also entitles the member to legal 
assistance, grievance procedures, life insurance and disability 
i nsurance. 
Interviews with Danish officers and non-commissioned offi-
cers revealed no serious disadvantages to union membership. 
From a Commander's point of view, the union is another organi-
zation with which the commander must deal effectively to {] 
accomplish the assigned mission.
2 
This was not, however, con-
sidered a serious disadvantage. 2 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
current Force Structure 
The Paris Treaties, which entered into force in May 1955, 
stip u lated a contribution of the Federal Republic to western 




Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union. In 1973 
the Federal Defense Force (Bundeswehr) had a total strength 
of 475,000. 
In 1973 the Army's total strength was 334,000, Navy 
strength was 36,000 and the Air Force had approximately 105,000 
officers and men. A special organization has been established 
to relieve the operational forces of tasks incompatible with 
combat mobility. Its current strength is 35,000 men. 
The supreme political authority is vested in the Minister 
of Defense. When it became clear that a defense system would 
again be established in 1954, politicians of all parties were 
determined that no rebirth of militarism would take place. 
Therefore, the armed forces were placed firmly in the hands 
of the government. Military policy reflects political aims 
determined by the government. For these reasons, every effort 
and action has been directed towards civilianization of the 
force.2 3 
The Federal Republic has compulsory military service for 
all men between the ages of 18 and 45. A man can be initially 
drafted between the ages of 18 and 25. However, the normal 
age for being called to service is 19-20 years of age. Per-
sonnel incur an initial obligation of 15 months and can be re-
called for an additional nine months of serv.ice up to age 45. 
Personnel can retire at a minimum age of 52.24 
Military Unionization in the Federal Republic of Germany 
The Federal Republic's combined armed forces are partially 
unionized by the German Armed Forces Society (GAFS) and the 
Public Service, Transport and Traffic Workers Union (O.T.V.). 
Union organization and recruitment was officially authorized 
in 1958, but it wasn't until 1966 that membership canvassing 
was allowed. Membership grew slowly over the years as there 
was a continued stigma attached to union membership by the 
senior officers. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the unions 
have become an integral part of the armed forces. 
The GAFS is by far the largest organization with approxi-
mately 180,000 active members. It represents only the armed 
forces while the OTV represents civil service as well as cer-
tain other non-governmental employees. The majority of GAFS 
members are career personnel. 
The GAFS and the OTV have stated that they intend to re-
present the service member in both the socio-political and 
economic spheres. They seek to create an acceptable image of 
the citizens in uniform and to dispel the past distrust the 
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German people have had towards the military. They also seek 
the familiar union membership economic benefits such as better 
pay, easier promotions, housing and family care, as well as 0 
social considerations relating to leisure hours, soci a l clubs 
and canteens. 
Within the Federal Republic of Germany, civil servant's 
unions are forbidden by law to strike. This law also applies 
to the armed forces. Neither the GAFS or OTV has any desire 
to interfere in military orders, since the Sold i er's Law of 0 
1956, and ame ndments thereto, outlines the limits an officer 
must stay within in issuing orders. 2 5 Neither will the union 
enter into grievances concerning duty assignments or interfere 
with disciplinary actions, as these are also adequately covered 
by the law.26 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Military Union Membership 
The unions have been successful in obtaining vario u s 
benefits for their members. Included among these benefits are 
better pay, legal aid, reduced insurance pre miums and special 
pay for arduous duty. With the help of retired members within 
the representative government the GAFS has been able to exert 
influence in various matters pertaining to the serviceman. 
Much effort has been expended in an endeavor to keep the serv-
iceman advised concerning the possible impact of current pol-
it i cal affairs. Society dues are quite low, with the monthly 
dues for a Captain (Army) approximately $1.50. 
Apparently, there are few, if any, disadvantages to mem-
bership in the unions. The previous stigma attached to member-
ship no l onger exists as evidenced by the increasing membership 
and number of senior officers who are current active members.2~ 
SWEDEN 
Current Force Structure 
The mi ssion of the Swedish Armed Forces as expressed by J 
the Swedish government and Parliament is to have such strength, 
composition and read i ness that an attack against Sweden would 
demand such great resources and sacrifices and take such a 
long time that the advantages that might be gained by such an 
attac k could not reasonably be estimated as worthwhile. 27 This 
missio n is part of Sweden's security policy which is to remain 
unaligned in peace time and neutral in war time. The Armed 
Forces are organized into three services . The Army consists 
of 10,000 , the Navy 15,000 and the Air Force 3,000 men. The 





The King and the Swedish Parliament exercise supreme 
command over the Armed Forces. The Minister of Defense is 
generally responsible for matters concerning the coordination 
of defense activities. The Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces is responsible to the Minister of Defense for opera-
tional matters concerning defense of the homeland. 
Sweden has compulsory military service for all men between 
18 and 47 years of age. Basic training for most conscripts 
is for 8-11 months with additional specialized training. Con-
scripts selected for officers and non-commissioned officers 
training serve a total of 14-24 months. About 50,000 men re-
ceive basic training each year. About 90% of all active duty 
personnel are conscripts. Additionally, about 100,000 men re-
ceive refresher training each year to create integrated units 
which can be mobilized rapidly. 
Military Unionization in Sweden 
Sweden is a highly unionized country with over 90% of 
its blue-collar and over 70% of its white-collar workers 
organized. As with most unions in Sweden, the military unions 
are a part of the larger national unions. The officers are 
represented by the Union of Swedish Officers which is a part 
of the National Swedish Federation of Government Employees. 
The warrant officers are represented by the Swedish Union of 
Warrant Officers which is a part of the Central Organization 
of Salaried Employees, Civil Servants Section. The non-
commissioned officers are represented by the Union of Non-
commissioned Officers in the Defense Force. All military per-
sonnel may belong to their respective unions with the exception 
of draftees. They usually maintain their private sector mem-
berships while on active duty. Practically 100% of eligible 
personnel, both officer and non-commissioned officer, are mem-
bers of their respective unions. 
The members of the military union have the right to strike 
during peacetime. The right to strike does not apply in war-
time and there has been recent debate concerning the right to 
strike in peacetime. Since practically all servicemen are 
members of the union, there seems to be general understanding 
concerning those matters which are appropriate for union 
bargaining. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Military Union Membership 
The unions have been effective in securing improved pay, 
longer vacations, higher per diem, better pensions and im-
proved working conditions for its members. Additionally, 
union members receive judicial aid, life insurance plans and 
81 
a formal grievance procedure for airing their complaints. No 
apparent disadvantages to union membership exist. The Swedish 
people consider belonging to a union a natural and fundamental 0 
right of a l l individuals. 
V. ITEMS FOR CONSIDERATION BY MILITARY MANAGERS 
Instead of attempting to reach any conclusions our goals 0 
have been to present background information on unionization 
coupled with some topics current military managers should be 
thinki ng about concerning the possibility of unionization in 
the U.S . military. The following questions are presented along 
with specific areas of concern to stimulate thought and discus-
sion: 
1. What would be the adva n tages a nd disadvantages of a 
military uhion to military personnel? (especially i n the 
areas of wa ges, benefits, and grievances) 
2. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of 
military unio n ization to the military manager? (especially in 
the areas of discipline, communication, chain-of-command, and 
decision making) 
3. What limitations should be imposed on military unions 
or potential unions? (especially in the ar~as of strikes, 
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During the last five or six years, there has been a great 
debate in the United States on the issue of the size of the 
role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in our society. Un-
fortunately, much of this debate has been characterized by an 
excess of jargon and invective which has aroused the emotions 
of all parties and clouded the basic issues. The most common-
ly heard term is the phrase, "Military-Industrial Complex" 
(MIC). Ironically, this phrase was coined by a great military 
man, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his farewell address 
in 1961. Since then, the MIC has come to mean many things to 
many people. This paper will, within limits, describe the MIC, 
what it is thought to be and what it is, and evaluate the in-
fluence that the MIC has on the American economy. 
The image normally brought to mind by the term, Military-
Industrial Complex, is a fearful collage of the old-fashioned 
"robber baron" conspiring with a "neo-fascijt" general and a 
"fat-cat" congressman to line all their pockets at the expense 
of everyone else and the nation as a whole. This is certainly 
far from what President Eisenhower had in mind when he said 
" ••• the establishment of a large arms industry is new to 
American experience. The total influence - economic, political, 
Ca.pta.-ln. R.A. Pa.c.ka.Jr.d, U.S. Mtlll..i.ne. Coti.p.6, ILe.c.e..i.ved h-l.6 B.S. de.gti.e.e. -i.n 
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eve n spiritual - is felt in every city, every statehouse, even 
every office of the Federal Government." Eisenhower was re-
ferring to the expanded need for military security measures 
bro ught on by the "Cold War," and the steadily rising needs for 
technology and associated expenses to provide that degree of 
security. Apparently Eisenhower felt that this establishment 
had gained a momentum of its own and was, at least potent i ally, 
an initiator of the costly arms race. 
The most obvious source of power in the MIC is numbers of 
people. As of 1965 the Department of Defense consisted of 2.75 
million military personnel and 900,000 civilians. Another 2.1 
million civilians worked in private industry on defense related 
contracts. This total constituted 8.6% of all employed workers 
in the United States and, by 1967, the percentage rose to 10.3%. 
(7: p. 319) These figures do not include employees of the 
Atomic Energy Commission and NASA although the work of these 
agencies is defense related. Another measure of the MI C • s 
power is t h e budget related to defense. The dollar value of 
the defense budget has grown almost steadily since the Korean 
War and has climbed at an even higher rate since 1960. The sum 
of all defense and war related government expenditures in Fisca l 
1968, including Veterans' benefits, interest on a federal debt 
brought on largely by World War II and Korea, space and techno-
logy, and international programs, came to about $500 per capita 
in Fiscal 1968 (7: p. 315) . These mon ies represent a great 
expense, and they also i mply a tremendous amount of power. The 
critics of the MIC use these trends and figures to argue that 
military spending is out of control a nd the MIC is an effective 
obstacle to limiting arms expenditures. Further analysis of 
defense spending, however, leads to some contradictory conclu-
sions . The table below provides so me additional information. 
Ye ar DOD Outlays % of GNP % of Federal 
$(billions) Bud~et 
1961 45 8.8 44 
1969 79 8.7 42 
1971 72 7.0 36 
From this table we ca n see that while DOD spending is increasing, 
its percentage of GNP and its propor ti on to other federal spend-
ing is decreasing. I n fact, DOD spending as a percentage of 
GNP in 1971 was the sm a llest since 1950. These figures lead 
one to conclude that military spending, while great in absolute 
magnitude is not comp l ete l y ou t of control and that whatever 
e l se it may be, the MIC is not completely effective in prevent-






Let us now investigate the elements that make up the MIC. 
The most obvious is the military establishment. The Armed 
Forces, for the sake of this discussion, can be characterized 
as being intensely interested in the security of the nation. 
They are held reponsible for that security and have the most 
obvious reasons for ensuring that they are provided with the 
hardware which is most likely to lead to their success. In 
addition to this, each of the service chiefs has some normal 
interest in increasing or maintaining his service's share in 
defense roles and missions, and in the corresponding budgets. 
This ability to increase the size of one's areas of responsibili-
ty is a major way for managers in any kind of bureaucracy to 
demonstrate their comparative importance to the organization. 
I 
The industrial portion of the MIC is diverse, yet a com-
mon ground does exist. Literally hundreds of firms sell to DOD. 
The portion of this group that is most potentially dangerous is 
that portion that does a majority of its business with the 
government. While other firms suffer little if they lost their 
government business, many firms, particuarly in the aerospace 
industry, depend in the most critical sense on defense contracts. 
These industries form a monopoly, in which a single buyer, DOD, 
dominates the market. Firms in the aerospace industry sold 
from 78% to 92% of their products to the government between 1961 
and 1971 (Aerospace Industries). This is a potentially danger-
ous situation because the government wields enormous power in 
the entry and exit of vendors from the market. There is extreme 
competition among the vendors to obtain government contracts. 
It is to the government's advantage to maintain this competition. 
To do this, it may be desirable to pay more for a product in the 
short run in order to protect a degree of competition in the 
long run. This is an unnatural market condition and tends to 
arouse suspicions as to conflict of interest, graft, and in-
efficiency. The aspect of this most likely to lead to real 
expenditure, however, is the lack of other markets. The 
existence of the business depends on continuing defense contracts 
and often research is undertaken to generate requirements for 
new contracts (2). The result could be spiraling defense ex-
penditures with little contribution to security. 
The third significant element of the MIC is the legis-
lature, important because no defense contracts are let without 
approval from both the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
The members of Congress are all characterized by a genuine 
concern for the security and well-being of the country and in 
varying degrees have knowledge of defense matters and expertise 
in dealing with defense appropriations. The provocative facet 
of Congress' character is the importance to him of the inter-
ests of his constituents. Congressmen and Senators are often 
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elected based, at l east partially, upon how successful they are 
in co n tributing to the prosperity of their home regions. There 
is little doubt, for example, that Charleston, s. C., and its 
environs have p r ofited greatly from the i n fluential part the 
l ate Mendel Rivers played as Chairman of the House Arme d 
Services Committee. On the other hand, there is ev i dence that 
this is not always the case. A study of the votes cast by 
Congressmen and Senators on the Safeguard ABM, 1969, the 
Cooper-Church Amendment, 1970, and the Super s onic Transport, 
1970, showed that the votes of those legislators whose constitu-
ents would benefit most directly from the associate d DOD con-
tracts were not significantly different, on a rank-order corre-
l ation bas i s, from ot her legislators. Still it is thought to 
be dangerous, politica l ly, t o be too outspoken against defense 
and security issues. Actually this risk varies from region to 
region and from time to time according to the mood of the 
electorate. 
There are additional aspects of the i n terfaces between 
these sectors which have been exploited f or a11 their po l itical 
worth. Among these are reserve officers of the Armed Forces 
serving as members of Congress, the existence of a "Legislative 
Liaison " office for DOD on Capitol Hill (15), the presence of 
several retired military officers in important pos i tions in 
defense contracting industries and administration lobbying 
abroad to assist in stimulating overseas sales. Most of these 
aspects and the more e l ementary aspects ment i oned earlier can 
be individually debated and discredited. Still, there seems 
to be an overall effect that is difficult to deny. Gradually, 
the MIC emerges as a "co nf l uence of interest" among the sectors, 
with some attendant grounds for competit i on rather than a sinis-
ter s e cretive conspiracy. 
It is difficult to completely evaluate the economic in-
fluence of the MIC without getting into a study of the needs 
for a national security effor t . We will assume, for the purpose 
of determining the eco nomic influence of the MIC, that moneys 
and effort expended for national security have yielded some 
useful result . In other words, DOD expenditures of some magni-
tude were necessary because disarmament was not practicable. 
Now we will examine the impact that such a large sector of 
spending has on the economy of the United States. 
John Kennet h Galbraith, a well-known modern economist, 
has discusse d the MIC and defense spending in the 1950's as a 
means for exercising f i scal policy ( 10: p . 22). While he goes 
on to say it was probably not the best means, it was acceptable 
to economists because i t was probably the on l y means of govern-







In his discussion of the MIC in The New Economic State, 
Galbraith discusses defense spending as a fiscal stabilizer 
because it is such a large amount of consumption that remains 
relatively constant, independent of the business cycle. This 
is a definite assist to the economy during periods of reces-
sion. 
The effect of defense spending on the balance of payments 
is complex. The presence of large numbers of Americans abroad 
in compliance with security agreements and in furtherance of 
our own defense aims is clearly a drain on our economy. How-
ever, in recent years, there has been a determined effort to 
offset this drain with overseas sales of military hardware. 
Since 1960, this has been one of the stated objectives of the 
International Logistics Negotiations Section of the Internation-
al Security Affairs Division of DOD (13: p. 250), and there is 
evidence that it has been a serious undertaking. In 1965, 
$500,000 was programmed for sales promotion and in 1967 the 
U.S. government spent $750,000 promoting U.S. arms at the Paris 
Air Show alone (13: pp. 195-6). If the size of these invest-
ments is any indication, the total sales of American weaponry 
abroad is undoubtedly a substantial assist to our balance of 
payments. 
While economists generally agree that de;ense spending 
has been a source of stability and consumption in our economy, 
most will also argue that if the same funds had been disbursed 
in other areas of the economy, there would have been a much 
more beneficial impact on the economy. Much of the defense bud-
get goes directly for salaries and wages and much of the rest 
goes to create something which can be used only once, i.e., 
bombs, missiles, bullets, and therefore this expenditure has 
added nothing to our production capacity. Other types of ex-
penditures, such as public works, would have provided more of 
an investment in future growth. Professor Kenneth Boulding is 
one economist of that ilk. He states " ... economy's growth rate 
has been diminished by as much as 2% per annum as a result of 
diversion of resources into the rat hole of competitive weapons 
systems, or even space technology." (10: p. 5) While the above 
effect is certainly true, it is exaggerated. The funds spent 
on defense have not been completely lost tq tha ·economy. As 
they are respent, they have an "accelerator effect," inducing 
some amount of private investment. Furthermore, to blame any 
of these losses on the MIC is to contradict our. assumption that 
defense spending is necessary for our security. True, if it 
were spent unnecessarily, it would have been a · waste. Defense 
spending is simply one of those regrettables · in our society 
like police and fire departments which are necessary to our 
well-being, but contribute little to our future economic well-
being. 
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This argument is extended to one which is very much in 
vogue today: that money spent on defense has caused deprivation 
of areas of more obvious social significance such as health, 
welfare, and education. This may be true from a social stand-
point, but probably not from an economic one. Welfare payments 
in particular are not likely to be as effective as defense 
expenditures in stimulating new investments and they have the 
additional effect of decreasing incentives to work and produce 
for the economy and society. There are indications also that 
improvements in health may require some action other than in-
creasing funding. For example, the United States already spends 
a greater proportion of its GNP on health care than does Great 
Britain, yet the death rates owing to the seven leading causes 
of death are rising in the U.S. and falling in Great Britain. 
Examination of recent education figures shows that while in re-
cent years funds for national defense have decreased, those 
for education have increased. There is little indication, how-
ever, that effectiveness of education has increased proportion-
ally. Lack of a good objective measure makes this difficult to 
prove one way or the other. 
Over the last hundred years, the economy of the United 
States has changed drastically, and one of the main reasons for 
this change has been technological advance. An examination of 
the effect of the MIC on the economy would be incomplete without 
a discussion of the effect of the MIC on technology. Today 
much of the research and development thrust is directed toward 
military hardware; in fact, in 1969 DOD and its contractors 
employed over 50% o f the industrial scientists and engineers 
engaged in research and developments in the United States (5). 
This is necessary due to the complexity of military weaponry to-
day, in that obsolescence is tantamount to defeat and technologi-
cal breakthroughs materially alter the balance of military power. 
This is largely the reason the de f ense procurement expenditures 
have risen so fast over the last several years. Even more 
sign i ficant than these costs is the result the expenditures 
have had on the overall economy. These long term contracts 
calling for large expenditures of capital have provided numerous 
benefits for the civilian sector. Most of the technology of 
the civilian aircraft industry came from military contracts. 
Nuclear power, radar, and the miniaturization o f the pocket 
calculator all resulted from military research and development. 
Clearly, a substantial portion of the technology that we appreci-
ate in our daily lives originated in defense sponsored or 
assisted research. · The military research and development of to-
day is in turn likely to be significant in th e civilian economy 
of tomorrow. Whether this technological gain would have been 
more beneficial to our economy if directed elsewhere is an open 
question, but there is a good chance that it just would not 











How has the MIC affected industry? Most industry has 
been affected only in a very indirect manner. The aerospace 
industry and certain other industries have certainly profited 
by defense spending and have probably come to identify with 
the goals of their benefactors, the armed services (8). They 
have in some cases come to be outspoken arms advocates and 
have participated in all the national debates on defense 
strategies. In some cases their marketing efforts, rather than 
the services themselves, have been the driving .force behind the 
procurement of new weapons systems (5). But has defense spend-
ing meant abnormal profits to some industries? In the absolute 
sense, the dollar value is undoubtedly high, but a Defense 
Industry Profits Survey submitted to Congress in 17 March 1971 
by the General Accounting Office showed that in the 1966-1969 
period, there was no significant difference in profits as a 
percentage of investment between industries that did more than 
10% of their business with DOD and those that did less than 10% 
of their business with DOD. 
In summary, we can say of this complex and pluralistic 
topic that the MIC does in fact exist. We have seen what it 
consists of and some of the reasons why it exists as it does. 
We have also taken a . look at the impact that the MIC has on the 
American economy through the defense budget. 
In conclusion, the MIC is probably no more effective and 
influential in maintaining a high level of federal spending 
than are other large complex or interest groups. The MIC is 
not a cohesive lobby group and at worst should be termed a 
necessary evil or "regrettable." Examination of the effects 
of defense spending on the economy show that there have been 
some very positive effects as well as some less desirable 
effects. Further, if the commodity purchased with those de-
fense funds, security, was necessary and effective then the 
MIC, through the defense budget, has served us in a most satis-
factory manner. 
One further point. In analyzing statements in which the 
term "Military Industrial Complex" is used, we must react first 
by making a determination as to whether the author is using an 
emotion charged label to help him prove a point. Far too often, 
the MIC is used as a sort of scapegoat for the difficulties 
this nation has had in reducing defense costs through careful 
negotiation and disarmament. To say the MIC prevents govern-
ment action in controlling the arms race overestimates the in-
fluence of the MIC and underestimates complexities in the 
problems of military balance. 
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